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ABSTRACT 
 
The European securities market infrastructure has been constantly characterised 
as fragmented and cumbersome. The era of immobilisation and dematerialisation of 
securities and the introduction of the intermediated system created a new challenge 
for the European Union: the harmonisation of corporate actions linked with 
securities issued and traded within the EU territory. This dissertation outlines the 
steps that major European institutions made for the creation of a harmonised and 
efficient securities market. The presentation of the existing regime is “food for 
thought” and still raises doubts but also future hopes. On the basis of the critical 
analysis of the existing level of harmonisation and the interaction between 
harmonised actions, this thesis proposes recommendations towards a structural 
reform so as to establish efficiency for the real economy and the end investor in the 
European securities markets.  
 
 
    Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
30 January 2016 
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INTRODUCTION   
 
Over the past decades, the development of the intermediated system had a 
significant impact on the volume of trading of corporate and government securities. 
In addition, increased trade across borders has created a variety of legal and 
operational issues. An important discussion concerns the investors’ engagement in 
corporate actions, as well as how the processing of corporate actions would function 
homogenously within Europe.   
The direct connection between the issuer of securities and the end investor is 
interrupted in indirect systems by a chain of intermediaries. This intervention has a 
practical impact in the exercise of corporate actions. It basically implies that all the 
necessary information must flow through this chain. In European equity markets 
there is no common pathway in relation to who is characterised as a shareholder, 
although non-national shareholders hold some 44% of the shares
1
. Moreover, the 
transmission of information is influenced by cross border difficulties. On the one 
hand, it is very difficult to identify the beneficiary of a corporate action and pass on 
information. On the other hand, national policies in the exercise of voting rights and 
dissimilar deadlines in income distribution create a huge gap in the processing of 
corporate actions. The first chapter, as starting point of the analysis, presents in 
depth these difficulties, by taking into account the structure of the intermediated 
system as the root of the problem.  
The European Union in response to this issue set a goal: to create transparency 
in the EU securities markets and to provide harmonised engagement rules that will 
ensure that both individual and institutional investors enjoy the rights linked to their 
shareholder status. Multiple institutions and working groups are involved in this 
effort. At the institutional European level, the harmonisation of corporate actions is 
accomplished by the European Commission, while the European Central Bank and 
Groups of Experts developed market standards. This work will present the legislative 
                                                     
1
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement 
and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, COM 
(2014) 213 final, Brussels, 9.4.2014, p 3.   
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and collective actions that affect corporate actions across borders targeted at 
providing a sound understanding of the existing regime, and to consequently 
comment on its positive and negative effects.  
The second chapter evaluates the European Commission’s actions which focus 
on general meetings. The basic instrument published by the Commission is the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC). This dissertation illustrates 
the Shareholders’ Rights Directive, as the basic tool which revealed the complexity of 
the harmonisation of corporate actions. Another great step was the Commission’s 
proposal for the amendment of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive. The proposal 
observes that there is difficulty in the exercise of rights flowing from securities to 
shareholders and inadequate transparency on costs. Furthermore, in February 2015 
the Commission, by publishing a Green Paper, set another important goal that 
affects corporate actions: the building of a Capital Markets Union. In relation to 
corporate actions, the Green Paper underlines main inefficiencies in the European 
securities markets connected with the intermediated chain.  
In addition, the third chapter demonstrates that market initiatives contribute to 
the harmonisation of corporate actions. Industry working groups, after multiple 
consultations, have achieved the creation of market standards that, based on the 
assumption that they are respected by market participants, favourably affect corporate 
actions processing in cross border situations. The presentation of the European 
actions will be completed with reference to the already operational project 
TARGET2-Securities (T2S). The efficiency of T2S requires harmonisation of corporate 
actions. This chapter mainly deals with the regulation of corporate actions 
processing and post trading activities, but there is also reference to general 
meetings.   
This study links the complexity of exercising corporate actions across the EU 
with the intermediated system. By presenting the current status of harmonisation, it 
unravels the existing gaps and requests further actions through a series of 
recommendations. 
 CHAPTER I: Intermediated chain: the gap between the issuer and the investor 
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CHAPTER I: Intermediated chain: the gap between the issuer and the 
investor 
 
Securities, such as bonds and shares, are issued by governments and corporations in 
order to raise money from financial markets. The issuance of securities is accompanied by 
statutory and contractual obligations. A government or a corporation issues bonds and must 
pay interest to bondholders
2
. Regarding shares, the corporation commits to pay dividends to 
the investor and grant him certain participatory rights. Such rights include, e.g. the right to 
attend meetings, to vote and participate in decisions on mergers, takeovers or stock splits. 
An extended part of the analysis focuses on the harmonisation of general meetings across 
the EU and, therefore, refers mainly to shares. However, issues observed with income 
payments are linked to bonds as well as shares. This section begins with an introduction to 
fundamental concepts and terminology associated with the processing of corporate actions. 
Subsequently, basic pathologies will be examined. 
 
1. Definition of corporate actions  
 
Corporate actions are linked with actions that the issuer of securities takes and result in 
an allocation of benefits to shareholders or bondholders or in an alteration to the security’s 
structure
3
. In more precise terms, corporate actions are “all kinds of actions triggered by the 
issuer or by the terms of a security which affect the security (equity or debt) and 
consequently the processing of corporate actions is necessary in the chain of account 
providers, in order to ensure that the investor participates in corporate actions”
4
. This thesis 
adopts the definition of the Legal Certainty Group because it analyses issues of legal 
uncertainty and it targets the integration of European securities clearing and settlement 
systems. To this end, it proposes a common EU definition for corporate actions. We must 
distinguish between mandatory corporate actions which take place irrespective of the 
                                                     
2
 T. Keijser, ‘Transactions in Securities’, in R. Goode, H. Kronke, and E. McKendrick (ed), Transnational 
Commercial Law, Texts, Cases, and Material, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, September 2015, p.  425.  
3
 M. Simmons and E. Dalgleish, Corporate Actions: A Guide to Securities Event Management, John Wiley & Sons, 
England, 2006, p. 3. 
4
 Legal Certainty Group, Second Advice of the Legal Certainty Group, Solutions to Legal Barriers related to Post-
Trading within the EU, Brussels, August 2008, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/certainty/2ndadvice_final_en.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 79.  
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investors’ decision (e.g. interests, redemption) and voluntary corporate actions where an 
instruction by the investor is required (e.g. merger).  
 
2. The system of intermediated securities  
 
Whereas in the past, securities were interchanged manually, today they are mostly 
transferred by book-entries, which means that the transfer requires a securities account and 
the interference of a third party, the account provider (often a bank or an investment firm)
5
. 
The transition from physical securities to ones that are immobilised and dematerialised takes 
place via a complex and sophisticated system. Securities are held in Central Securities 
Depositories (hereinafter CSDs) and the transmission of securities is promoted further by the 
so called intermediaries or custodians, which maintain securities accounts with the CSD. The 
custodians holding the securities will normally hold them on behalf of end investors in an 
omnibus account
6
. Each custodian signs a bilateral contract with its immediate client and is 
also linked with a bilateral contractual relationship with its immediate sub-custodian
7
. 
Investors, then, constitute the beneficial shareholders, placed at the end of a chain which 
links securities with the CSD through a number of intermediaries
8
 (picture 1). 
 
Picture 1: A simple intermediated shareholding  
(Source: A. Hainsworth, The Shareholders Rights Directive and the challenge of refinancing beneficial 
shareholders, Law and Financial Markets Review, 11, 2007, p. 14). 
 
                                                     
5
 European Commission, Legislation on legal certainty of securities holdings and dispositions, Consultation 
Document of the services of the Directorate-General Internal market and services, DG Markt G2 MET/OT/acg D 
(2010) 768690, Brussels, 2010, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/securities/consultation_paper_en.pdf> (date 
accessed: 12-12-2015) p. 4. 
6
 J. Payne, ‘Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK’, in L. Gullifer, J. Payne (ed), Intermediated 
Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 194. 
7
 E. Micheler, Custody Chains and Remoteness - Disconnecting Investors from Issuers, March 2014, available at 
SSRN :  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413025> (date accessed: 12-12-2015) p. 5. 
8
 In some jurisdictions there is, besides the CSD, no other intermediary involved and investors hold their 
securities directly with the CSD. These systems are called transparent systems.  
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3. The identification of the investor 
 
Whilst it is indisputable that developments in the immobilisation and dematerialisation 
of securities have resulted in the facilitation of cross-border investment, this financial 
infrastructure has an undesirable drawback: a weakening of the interface between issuers 
and the ultimate holders of their securities
9
. The end investor that faces the economic risk is 
usually at least two or three, if not more stages removed from the issuer (picture 2).  
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: The intermediated system 
(Source: T. Keijser, ‘Transactions in Securities’, in R. Goode, H. Kronke, and E. McKendrick (ed), Transnational 
Commercial Law, Texts, Cases, and Material, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, September 2015, p.  427). 
 
When securities cross borders this side effect is even more prominent. The consequence 
of this remoteness is that the issuer has no knowledge of many of its ultimate investors’ 
                                                     
9
 A. Hainsworth, The Shareholders Rights Directive and the challenge of refinancing beneficial shareholders, 
Law and Financial Markets Review, 11, 2007, p. 12. 
Central securities depository 
Intermediary 1 
Intermediary 2 
Intermediary 3 Intermediary 4 
Account holder/ 
investor 1 
Account holder/ 
investor 2 
Account holder/ 
investor 3 
Account holder/ 
investor 4 
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identities. This is a first pathology observed in the intermediated chain. Additionally, each 
jurisdiction has formed a different legal framework concerning the property model that 
governs this holding chain
10
. In this regard, the notion and the rights of the shareholder are 
adapted to the law that governs each bilateral contract in the chain. Whichever property 
model is applied, the end investor, who faces the economic risk of the investment, should be 
ultimately entitled to exercise the rights attached to the securities and not the registered 
shareholder at the top level of the chain. However, reality has proved that in complex 
intermediated chains it is very difficult to reach the ultimate account holder. Furthermore, it 
should be underlined that there are investors that do not form part of the intermediated 
chain and prefer to remain anonymous by operating through nominees
11
.  
 
4. Transmission of information and liability  
 
The issuer is where the corporate action originates
12
. As mentioned before, the identity 
of the end investor may not be known to the issuer. This situation consequently prevents 
direct communication, except with investors registered under their own name. 
Communication therefore needs to take place through the chain of intermediaries.  
In the announcement of a corporate action event the end investor must become aware 
of every action that influences the value of shares. For this reason, the issuer must 
constantly provide such information to investors from the top of the chain to the bottom 
(downstream flow). In particular, a research conducted by Oxera observed that “there is no 
standard way in which the events are announced by issuers, there is not a securities 
identification system that is universally accepted, and the processing details and terminology 
are often highly specific to the particular market or financial instrument”
13
. There is also lack 
of accurate information since there are long deadlines for instructions and market 
                                                     
10
 For example there is the trust model (UK), the security entitlement model (US), the undivided property 
model (France), the pooled property model (Germany – Japan), the transparent model (Greece), for more 
information see P. Paech, Cross-border Issues of securities Law: European efforts to support securities markets 
with a coherent legal framework, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 2011, pp. 14 – 20. 
11
 See T. Keijser (n 2) p. 427.  
12
 An exemption to this rule exists in takeovers where a third party (potential acquirer) initiates corporate 
actions. 
13
 Oxera, Corporate action processing: what are the risks?, May 2004,  available at: 
<www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/WhitePapers/oxera_2004.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 12. 
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fluctuations usually appear. Another complication is that the information of the issuer may 
be misinterpreted by market participants, which leads to biased decisions. For mandatory 
actions with options and for voluntary actions, the flow of information additionally goes 
upstream in order to transmit instructions from the investor to the issuer
14
.  For example, 
voting instructions given by the investor must reach the issuer timely via the holding chain. 
In this situation, it has been underlined that the large number of intermediaries in a chain 
and the presence of several fund managers complicate matters. This results, for example, in 
inconsistent instructions from the same investor and time lapse of crucial deadlines in the 
upstream flow of information
15
.  
Generally, CSDs and intermediaries do not consider themselves liable because their duty 
is to enable the communication between the issuer and the investor. It must be taken into 
consideration that liability is formed in the context of each bilateral contract between the 
participants of the intermediated chain. As a consequence, it has been observed that liability 
is rejected when matters arise in other levels of the chain. Another example linked with this 
problem is that retail customers usually sign standard terms offered by the intermediary, but 
even if they are protected under national law, the erosion of contractual terms across 
borders also erodes investors’ primary rights
16
.  
 
5. The obstacles in exercising voting rights 
 
Usually, corporate actions events are subject to prior shareholder approval at a general 
meeting and the latter itself can also be seen as a corporate action
17
. Generally, it is the 
register at the top level of the chain that indicates the names of the shareholders who are 
entitled to vote. According to the intermediated system of shareholding the registered 
owner holds the rights to the shares and instructions on how to vote should be capable of 
being passed up the chain (upstream flow) to this registered owner who is legally entitled to 
cast votes
18
.  Therefore, the registered shareholder may be located at the upper tier level of 
                                                     
14
 Oxera (n 13) p. 12. 
15
 N. Rachman, M. Vermaas, ‘Corporate Actions in the Intermediated System: Bridging the Gap between Issuer 
and Investor’, in T.Keijser (ed), Transnational Securities Law, Oxford University Press, March 2014, pp. 164-165. 
16
 E. Micheler, Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty, (February 10, 2014), LSE Legal Studies Working 
Paper No. 3/2014, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336889> (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 6. 
17
 <http://www.corporate-actions.net/Events.html> (date accessed: 03-12-2015).  
18
 J. Payne (n 6) p. 197.  
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the intermediated chain whereas the investor with the economic stake has no direct 
influence upon the voting procedure (picture 2). For this reason, the investor must be 
enabled to pass its voting preference through intermediaries.  
The voting results at the annual general meeting of Daimler AG that took place in Berlin 
on April 1, 2015, is sufficient to indicate a core problem. The total number of represented 
shares was only 36,15 %
19
. A key explanation links the participation of shareholders with the 
complexity of the intermediated chain
20
. Basically, end investors will exercise their voting 
rights when the meeting notice arrives promptly.  Furthermore, even when the ultimate 
account holder gives voting instructions, the votes may be delivered after the crucial time of 
the voting procedure. It has also been observed that the voting procedure terminates when 
the sufficient percentage of votes is achieved
21
. 
In some jurisdictions, end investors are given the right to appoint a proxy holder who is 
bound to participate in the general meeting and act according to their instructions. 
However, it is not obligatory for intermediaries to provide such service because it is 
considered costly. Furthermore, it has been observed that there are negative effects related 
to proxy communication as votes are lost, miscounted and information is distorted
22
. 
Confusion is also observed when the intermediary, as registered shareholder, must vote 
representing more than one account holder having different opinions about the votes. The 
allowance to split votes may be problematic.  
 
6. Trading and ownership of securities 
 
In the securities market place, the changing of ownership affects corporate actions. The 
establishment of the record date structure for shareholders identification is linked with the 
assumption that relatively few shares would change ownership between the record date and 
the meeting date
23
. Nevertheless, reality is very different nowadays when securities are 
                                                     
19
<http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/2620681_Daimler_AM_2015_Voting_Results.pd
f> (date accessed 16-09-2015). 
20
 M. Kahan, E. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, 2008, p. 
1250.   
21
 See M. Kahan (n 20) p. 1253. 
22
 D.C. Donald, The rise and effect of the Indirect Holding System, September 2007, p. 34. 
23
 Latham & Watkins LLP, Empty Voting and Other Fault Lines Undermining Shareholder Democracy: The New 
Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds, M & A Deal Commentary, April 2007, available at: 
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traded cross – border in a 24/7 basis. Tactics such as securities lending
24
 and short selling
25
 
are basic activities carried out by intermediaries resulting in an alteration to the entitled 
owner of the securities.  
The abovementioned situation creates two core problems. Firstly, when the processing 
of a corporate action has already initiated and transmitted through the chain of 
intermediaries, the change of the ownership in securities creates confusion as to who is 
entitled to benefit from a corporate action, e.g. the seller or the buyer. Secondly, it affects 
negatively the exercise of voting rights. For example, there will be investors who have voting 
rights but no economic interest and on the other hand there will be investors who have an 
economic interest but do not have the right to vote
26
. Additionally, it may create a mismatch 
in the votes as both sellers and buyers of the shares may have been eligible to send their 
vote preference through proxies
27
.  
 
7. The difficulties in income distribution 
 
The payment of income is another type of corporate action. Examples of income 
payments are cash or securities distributions. The income is often distributed through the 
intermediated chain and therefore, intermediaries again play a key role in the transmission 
of income. The issuer pays the income to the CSD, which has no right to it but is obliged to 
transmit it through the chain. For dividend payments, delays have been observed up to 2–3 
                                                                                                                                                                     
<https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1878_1.Commentary.Empty.Voting.pdf>  (date accessed: 
13-12-2015) p. 3.  
24
 See M. C. Faulkner, An Introduction to Securities Lending, Spitalfields Advisors Limited, fourth edition, 
London, 2007, available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/gilts/slcgjun05.pdf> (date 
accessed: 13-12-2015). 
25
 For short selling see M. Simmons and E. Dalgleish (n 3) p. 29. 
26
 As Paul Myners wrote “Borrowing shares for the purpose of acquiring the vote is inappropriate, as it gives a 
proportion of the vote to the borrower which has no relation to their economic stake in the company”, Review 
of the Impediments to voting UK shares, Report to the Shareholder Voting Working Group, March 2005.   
27
 Consider the following example: End investor A sends the proxy and the voting instructions to his custodian 
or voting agent before the cut-off date that the latter has set; however, after the aforementioned cut-off date 
end investor A chooses to transfer his shares to B; end investor B’s shares are held in custody with a different 
custodian, who has set his own cut-off date later in time; thus, B is still eligible to send the proxy and the voting 
instructions to his custodian; the result is that both the custodian or voting agent of shareholder A and the 
custodian of shareholder B will forward the votes to the tabulator of the issuer, since all aforementioned 
actions occurred before the official record date set by the corporation. Example taken from: P. Masouros, Is the 
EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously?: An Essay on the Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe, 
European Company Law, Vol. 7, Issue 5, October 2010, p. 198.  
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
17 
  
months
28
. Late payments cause losses to investors. Moreover, the identification of the 
investor and the correct bank account information are vital. However, identification failure is 
possible. Firstly, post trading activities are intertwined with transaction failures that result 
from the changing of ownership in securities. Secondly, it may derive from intermediaries’ 
reports regarding the information of the investor, which contains errors. Such failures must 
be managed because they create an unsafe investment environment.  
 
8. Focus of attention to Europe 
 
The abovementioned analysis shows that the EU market infrastructure is cumbersome 
and complex. The European regulator must focus on the issues below, in order to achieve 
legal certainty and harmonisation of corporate actions: 
· Create a common definition of shareholder within the EU. 
· Harmonise cross border voting, taking into account that the general meeting is the 
source of corporate actions and establish homogenous key dates.  
· Create transparency in the intermediated chain and an efficient flow of information 
because it is the key element in the processing of corporate actions. 
· Standardise income payments, post trading activities and manage transaction 
failures.   
                                                     
28
 Oxera (n 13) p. 30. 
 CHAPTER II: Commission’s actions for the harmonisation of EU securities markets 
 
18 
 
CHAPTER II: Commission’s actions for the harmonisation of EU 
securities markets 
 
During the lifecycle of securities, a company seeks approval for decisions from the 
shareholders. The European Commission focuses on the improvement of European 
shareholders’ rights
29
. The first step was taken in June 2007 with the adoption of the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive (hereinafter SRD)
 30
. The SRD improved shareholders’ 
engagement in general meetings, whilst in other topics it remained silent. The second step 
took place in April 2014, when the Commission proposed a revision of the SRD. Finally, in 
February 2015, the Commission published a Green Paper that addressed both the SRD and 
its proposed revision and set out further development plans.  
 
1. An overview of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive 
 
The SRD is the basic legal instrument that introduced minimum standards to ensure that 
shareholders of companies, whose shares are traded on a regulated market, receive the 
relevant information timely and are enabled to vote at a distance
31
. Whilst it is not 
interpreted as “a kick-start of the EU Member States into the digital age”, it attempts to 
reduce procedural costs through the use of the internet. 
32
. The rules established by the SRD 
affect compulsorily four steps of the shareholder meeting which are shareholder 
identification and authentication, information in the downstream flow, communication in 
the upstream flow and voting
33
. 
                                                     
29
 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexa_en.htm> (date accessed: 02-10-2015). 
30
 Directive 2007/36/EC. It was transposed in the Greek legislation with article 6 of law 3884/2010 and was 
integrated as article 28A of law 2190/1920 for SA.   
31
 Press Release, Corporate Governance: Directive on Shareholders' Rights Formally Adopted, 12 June 2007, 
available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-800_en.html> (date accessed: 02-10-2015). 
32
 D. Zetzsche, Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the Shareholder Rights Directive, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008, CBC-RPS No. 0031, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120915> 
(date accessed: 02-10-2015), p. 1. 
33
 The division derives from D. Zetzsche (n 32) pp. 34 – 49. 
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1.1 Shareholders’ identification and authentication 
 
Generally, there was a legal uncertainty in Europe over how to determine entitlement 
and how this must be realised
34
. In some jurisdictions, shareholders were asked to deposit 
their shares before the general meeting in order to prove their entitlement
35
. The SRD 
abolishes share blocking, which banned the trading of shares for a certain period until the 
general meeting and establishes the record date system as the mandatory mechanism for 
shareholders’ identification and authentication
36
. The record date is a specific time prior to 
the general meeting which determines who is allowed to exercise voting rights. The SRD 
does not define this date but it sets that the limit cannot be any earlier than 30 days before 
the meeting
37
.  
Furthermore, it has also been observed that the vast majority of shareholders are non 
nationals of the issuing company and exercise their rights via complex chains of securities 
intermediaries
38
. Indeed, in cases that one intermediary refuses to promote voting rights all 
other bilateral agreements are rendered worthless and the voting chain dysfunctional
39
. 
However, the SRD did not establish rules that directly refer to the intermediated chain 
although it recognises its significance
40
.  
Indirectly though, article 13 of the SRD is applicable when the intermediary cast votes 
on behalf of end investors. Nevertheless, the relationship between the end investor and the 
intermediary is still determined by national provisions of Member States. In the context of 
article 13 SRD the term “client” designates the end investor
41
. It therefore recognises that 
firstly, intermediaries must be allowed to exercise voting rights on behalf of their clients, 
                                                     
34
 Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe, Final Report: Cross-Border Voting in Europe, WODC no. 
2002/ 6, The Hague, 2002, available at: <https://www.wodc.nl/images/on2002-6-summary_tcm44-57611.pdf>  
(date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 1. 
35
 For example, see article 28 of Greek Law 2190/1920 for SA. Share blocking is still applicable for shares which 
are not traded in stock exchange.   
36
 Article 7(2) SRD. 
37
 Art 7(3) SRD. 
38
 See Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe (n 34) p. 1. 
39
 See D. Zetzsche (n 32) p. 56. 
40
 Recital 11 of the SRD reads “In order to enable the investor to exercise his voting rights in cross-border 
situations, it is therefore important that intermediaries facilitate the exercise of voting rights”. The SRD 
proposes the matter to be harmonised via a non binding act of a Recommendation, under article 288 of the 
TFEU.  
41
 See analysis of the article 13 in Conac P. H., ‘Rights of the Investor’, in P. H. Conac, U. Segna and L. Thévenoz 
(ed), Intermediated Securities: The impact of the Geneva Securities Convention and the Future European 
Legislation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 113-122. 
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provided that they have received instructions. Secondly, intermediaries are able to vote via 
omnibus accounts not requiring temporal registration of shares into individual accounts. 
Furthermore, in this case, intermediaries are allowed to split votes and to appoint a proxy or 
any third party designated by the client. Nevertheless, the application of article 13 seems 
insufficient because it does not oblige all custodians’ and CSD’s collaboration along a cross 
border chain. 
 
1.2 Downstream flow of information  
 
The downstream flow of information refers to actions that the company must take for 
dissemination of information, notably before the general meeting. The first attempt to 
harmonise the transmission of such information for listed companies was in the 
Transparency Directive
42
. The SRD extends these requirements
43
. Initially, it sets a minimum 
notice period of 21 days before the day of the general meeting. Secondly, it proposes the 
transmission of information through two methods know as “pull” or “push” methods
44
. The 
pull method refers to the obligation of the company to provide all the relevant information 
in the company’s website, where the shareholder has access and is able to get information 
about the convocation and other useful material. In case the company cannot inform 
through a website, the push method implies that it must send the information in paper form 
by post or by electronic means and without cost for this service, after an identification 
process.  
 
1.3 Communication in the upstream flow 
 
One of the key provisions of the SRD is the possibility that shareholders put items on the 
agenda and table draft resolutions for items on the agenda, with a minimum ownership 
requirement that does not exceed five per cent of the company’s share capital
45
. They are 
also given the right to communicate with the management team and ask questions related 
                                                     
42
 Directive 2004/109/EC, see recital 22 and article 21. 
43
 Article 5 SRD. 
44
See D. Zetzsche (n 32) pp. 39 – 42. 
45
 Article 6 SRD. 
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to the items on the agenda
46
. For this reason, the agenda must be available to shareholders 
within sufficient time, so that they are able to become active players and interact with the 
management team. It is also important to underline that whenever the SRD refers to writing, 
it mandates that “writing” be understood as submission by post or electronic means
47
. 
 
1.4 Voting 
 
The SRD promotes the electronic participation of shareholders in the general meeting by 
establishing three key features: electronic proxy voting, electronic direct voting and virtual 
shareholder meetings. It basically implies that the physical presence is no longer necessary. 
Furthermore, the SRD eliminates restrictions on eligibility to act as proxy holder and 
excessive prerequisites for the process of proxy appointment
48
. The proxy may be any legal 
entity and the only requirement for its appointment is its legal capacity and its obligation to 
address any potential conflict of interests. Moreover, the proxy can be appointed by 
electronic means and it is enhanced with the same rights as shareholders during the general 
meeting. Finally, the SRD implies that every company offers to its shareholders at least one 
effective method of notification by electronic means. The effect of articles 10 and 11 of the 
SRD was commented as significant: “with its coming-into-force, all European public 
companies must offer some type of electronic proxy voting system to their shareholders, 
and using the system, the shareholder is free to choose whether he wishes to grant a proxy 
to a corporate representative or any person that he so designates”
49
.  
 
2. Proposed revision of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive  
 
The SRD designated that the transposition period for each member state would not 
exceed 3rd August 2009
50
. Until today, its implementation does not seem to have covered 
the cross-border gaps that the intermediate system creates. Particular deficiencies in the 
                                                     
46
 Article 9 (1) SRD. 
47
 Article 6(1) SRD. 
48
 L. Renebogg, P. Szilaguyi, ‘Shareholder engagement at European general meetings’, in M. Belcredi, G. 
Ferrarini (ed), Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies, Facts, Context and Post-crisis Reforms, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 326. 
49
 See D. Zetzsche (n 32) p. 45. 
50
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drafting of the SRD showed that there was a need for a revision that would address in 
greater depth issues that the original text left unregulated. This section addresses the main 
disadvantages of the SRD and summarizes the amendments proposed by the Commission in 
April 2014.  
 
2.1 The incomplete solutions of Shareholders’ Rights Directive 
 
It has been argued that the SRD contains a technical definition of shareholder that is not 
uniform with the notion of the ultimate account holder
51
. In particular, article 2 of the SRD 
states that shareholder means the natural or legal person that is recognised as a shareholder 
under the applicable law. An investor’s right to participate in general meetings still remains 
local property law and the registered shareholder at the upper tier of the intermediated 
chain has no obligation to facilitate cross border voting. Hence, the SRD, by not harmonising 
who is entitled to become a shareholder, fails to give to end investors direct rights against 
their securities intermediaries.  
It has also been observed that the silence of the SRD with regard to intermediaries’ 
participation is particularly unfavourable
52
. Even when the end investor is equipped with 
voting rights under the national law of one Member State, the proposed rules do not imply 
that all intermediaries, in cross border chains, will comply and promote voting instructions 
received from the end investor or that they will all facilitate proxy voting
53
. It must be taken 
into account that such unwillingness may be facilitated where the applicable national law 
does not impose such obligation on intermediaries. Recital 11 of the SRD states that 
intermediaries will be regulated in the form of a recommendation. Nevertheless, the choice 
of a recommendation as a legal act is insufficient because it cannot have a binding effect on 
the intermediary – investor relationship and it is underlined that this recommendation has 
not been drafted up until today.  
Although the right to put items on the agenda seems to be a triumph, it has been 
underlined that the provision on shareholder proposals is an “empty letter”, because the 
                                                     
51
 A. Hainsworth (n 9) p. 17. 
52
 See D. Zetzsche (n 32) p. 50. 
53
 European Corporate Governance Forum, Annual Report 2006, Brussels, January 2007, available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-annual-report-2006_en.pdf> (date 
accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 3. 
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five per cent ownership threshold is highly restrictive, as it is very difficult for shareholders 
to access share registries, to congregate and to form alliances
54
. Furthermore, it was 
negatively commented that the SRD refers to equal treatment of shareholders
55
. The notion 
of equality appears vague in the context of the SRD. In a similar vein, the equal treatment 
seems contradictory to the downstream flow of information because the company may 
choose to send information to a specific category of shareholders, (push method) while 
other shareholders will be informed through the company’s website (pull method)
56
. 
 
2.2 Proposed amendments to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive 
 
The issues that the SRD left uncovered revealed the complexity to manage the 
intermediated shareholding system across borders and gave birth to a proposal amending 
the SRD
57
 (hereinafter proposed revision of SRD) which recognised that shareholders’ rights 
were hindered because of the market’s infrastructure
58
. The orientation of the amendments 
focuses particularly on: the identification of the shareholders, the transmission of 
information and the facilitation of the exercise of shareholders’ rights
59
.  
The proposed revision of SRD took an innovative step. New rules allow a listed company 
to identify its shareholders for the facilitation of voting rights and more specifically, oblige all 
intermediaries in the chain to disclose the contact details of shareholders without undue 
delay
60
. The project will be assisted by the Legal Entity Identifier, an international centralised 
database that will ensure consistent and comparable data about the identity of legal persons 
who act as shareholders
61
. The obligation to provide contact details is extended to any third 
                                                     
54
 See P. Masouros, Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously?: An Essay on the Impotence of 
Shareholdership in Corporate Europe, European Company Law, vol. 7, issue 5, October 2010, available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686725> (date accessed: 06-12-2015) p. 201. 
55
 See Article 4 of the Shareholders Rights Directive and A. Hainsworth (n 9) pp. 16-17.  
56
 P. Masouros (n 54) p. 197. 
57
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, COM (2014) 213 final, 
Brussels, 9.4.2014, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexa_en.htm>  
(date accessed: 14-11-2015). 
58
 See Recital (5) and (6) of the proposed revision of the SRD. See also Commission, Impact Assessment 
accompanying the document in (n 57) SWD(2014) 127 final Brussels 9.4.2014, p. 35. 
59
 The division stems from the text of the proposed revision of the SRD.  
60
 Article 3a of the proposed revision SRD. 
61
 See European Commission (n 57) p. 9. 
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country intermediary that offers services in the EU territory through a branch
62
.  The contact 
details will be used for direct communication between the company and the shareholder 
and they will be maintained for 24 months. When the company does not choose a direct 
communication with the shareholder, article 3b applies: it mandates all participants of the 
intermediated chain to transmit information both in the downstream and the upstream flow 
timely. Particularly for voting rights, intermediaries are required to transmit the voting 
information from the shareholder to the company and confirm the vote to the 
shareholder
63
. The facilitation of voting rights through the downstream and the upstream 
flow of information will be enhanced by the Commission’s implementing acts that will 
specify for example the content of the voting confirmation and deadlines for this action. 
Finally, a significant amendment implies that intermediaries are obliged to publicly disclose 
the pricing of all their provided services
64
. 
The current amendments, however, did not escape from criticism. The basic drawback is 
that the new legal text emphasizes that the identification of shareholder is subject to 
national law of Member States
65
. Another deficiency constitutes the lack to establish 
penalties and to provide inspection measures
66
. Although the ECB welcomed the provisions 
related to the request of identification, other market participants disagreed with its 
functionality
67
. More specifically, it was opinioned that the efficient exercise of shareholders’ 
rights has no relation with the ability of companies to have their shareholders identified but 
it is based on the efficiency of the intermediated chain to proceed timely and securely in the 
exchange of the relevant information
68
. It was also emphasized that, as shares are traded 
                                                     
62
 Article 3e of the proposed revision of the SRD. 
63
 Article 3c of the proposed revision of the SRD. 
64
 Article 3d of the proposed revision of the SRD. 
65
 The original text of the proposed revision of the SRD, article 3a (1) reads “Member States shall ensure that 
companies have the right to identify their shareholders, taking account of existing national systems” available 
at:<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0257+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#BKMD-6> (date accessed: 12-11-2015). 
66
 Böckli et al., Shareholder Engagement and Identification, 23 February 2015, Available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568741> (date accessed: 12-11-2015) p. 7. 
67
 European Central Bank, Building a Capital Markets Union – Eurosystem contribution to the European 
Commission’s Green Paper, Frankfurt, 2015, available at: 
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68
 European Banking Federation, EBF Position Paper on the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive amending the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) of 9 April 2014 - COM(2014) 213 final, Brussels, October 
2014, available at: <http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/EBF_010608-Revision-of-the-
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continuously, the shareholder status would never be accurate when the issuer receives the 
information. The proposal for a full identification would generate considerable costs, 
because it must proceed via the entire holding chain and involves numerous transactions
69
.  
 
3. Green paper “Building a Capital Markets Union”  
 
 The realisation of a common economic and financial market that exceeds national 
structures was recently addressed in a Green Paper published by the Commission in 
February 2015. The European Commission accepted once again the challenge to unlock 
investment in European companies and market infrastructure in order to create a Capital 
Markets Union. It is important to mention the Green Paper because it refers to general 
observations that will improve market effectiveness, intermediaries’ infrastructure and the 
broader legal framework. 
The Commission observes that the recently expressed goal of a Capital Markets Union is 
hindered by differences in relation to the legal ownership in securities. In this regard, it 
welcomes a convergence of views that call for a targeted change as to the property model of 
securities holding. Furthermore, it comments on corporate actions and notices that the 
technological development with the target to decrease costs and enable voting procedures, 
still remains on a theoretical level. Shareholders are still deprived of electronic voting and 
many EU companies do not use on-line registration systems
70
. For this reason, the European 
Commission through this Green Paper urges that the use of modern technologies in these 
areas could help reduce costs and burdens, but also ensure more efficient communication, 
particularly in a cross-border context. 
In response to this Green Paper, the European Central Bank (ECB) underlined that a key 
point for the building of a Capital Markets Union is to enhance the exchange of information 
between investors, shareholders and CSDs across the investment chain and industry plays a 
major role in this objective
71
. Likewise, the European Securities and Market Authority 
(ESMA) expressed its view on the Green Paper and underlined the need for further 
                                                     
69
  Böckli,  et al. (n 66) p. 7.  
70
 European Commission, Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final, Brussels, 
February 2015, <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/green-
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improvements, despite the existence of the SRD and its proposed revision. It therefore 
proposed the standarisation of record dates, ex dates and other deadlines in the voting 
process
72
. In addition, it stated that intermediaries’ cooperation in voting processes and 
confirmation of vote delivery would also maximize the benefits arising from increased 
automation of general meetings.  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Taking everything into account, the SRD did not respond effectively to the challenges. It 
was though, “food for thought” for the next steps. The EU legislator turned its attention to 
the financial infrastructure of the 21
st
 century. For this reason, the proposed revision of the 
SRD involved positive elements that would create transparency in the custody chain. The 
proposal for the amendment of the SRD has already been approved by the European 
Parliament on the 8th July 2015 and the matter has been referred back to the committee 
responsible for reconsideration
73
. Albeit this great step, it did not embrace any provision for 
the ultimate account holders and the question as to who owns securities within EU markets 
still remains unanswered.   
  
                                                     
72
 European Securities and Market Authority, ESMA response to the Commission Green Paper on Building a 
Capital Markets Union, 2015/ESMA/856, Paris, May 2015, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-876_press_release_-
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CHAPTER III: Market Standards and the European Central Bank’s 
actions for the harmonisation of corporate actions 
 
The harmonisation of corporate actions processing is influenced by the activity of major 
players in the securities industry and the advent of the ECB’s project, TARGET2-Securities 
(T2S). A key point for the analysis that follows is the functional distinction between i) the 
processing of a corporate action on stocks, which refers to usual corporate actions events 
that result in distributions or reorganisations and ii) the processing of a corporate action on 
flows, which deals with the management of a pending transaction
74
. Both the industry and 
the ECB target to create market standards in order to consolidate the processing of 
corporate actions and the general meetings across EU.  
 
1. Dismantling Giovannini Barrier 3 with the creation of market standards 
 
It was first observed by the Giovannini Group, in 2001, that the fragmentation in the EU 
clearing and settlement infrastructure was hindered because of the differences in national 
rules relating to corporate actions, beneficial ownership and custody (Barrier 3)
75
. The task 
of tackling the operational differences in corporate action processing was assigned to the 
Clearing and Settlement Advisory and Monitoring Expert Group (the CESAME2 group) which 
initiated actions in 2004 and invited the private sector to create market standards
76
. Since 
the dissolution of CESAME in 2008, market participants promoted an entirely self-guided 
harmonisation progress. The Broad Stakeholder Group (BSG), an industry working group, 
chaired by the European Banking Federation (EBF) and composed of issuers and other 
market participants, has undertaken this role and has formed two Joint Working Groups to 
elaborate the respective standards. Thus, the groups established key principles which are 
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 T2S Advisory Group, T2S Corporate actions standards – Market claims, 16 May 2013, 09.04.01/2013/004654, 
available at: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/subcorpact/20130516-t2s-market-claim-
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significantly important as they constitute the basis for the other driver of corporate actions 
standards, the TARGET2-Securities corporate action standards. 
  
1.1 European industry standards: a self regulatory instrument 
 
Market standards derive from the identification and endorsement of practices 
recognised by the whole securities industry as “state-of-the-art” principles
77
. In the cross 
border context, the processing of a corporate action requires the adoption of a common 
European language that will define concepts, terms, and key dates
78
.  The first set of market 
standards is based on the analysis of the Joint Working Group on General Meetings and has 
the objective to harmonise general meetings
79
. They are applicable to all types of shares 
with the condition that issuers have a registered office or an issuer CSD in Europe
80
. The 
second set is created by the Corporate Actions Joint Working Group and focus on the 
harmonisation of corporate actions processing
81
. For these standards the title Corporate 
Actions Joint Working Group standards is also very common (hereinafter CAJWG standards). 
Their scope of application is extended to all types of corporate actions provided that the 
issuer CSD is situated in Europe
82
.  
 
1.1.1 Market Standards on General Meetings (MSGM Standards) 
 
Initially, it was questionable whether or not general meetings are included in the notion 
of corporate actions as described in Giovannini Barrier 3. However, they must be taken into 
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 Market Standards for Corporate Actions Processing & for General Meetings, Guiding Principles, available at: 
<http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/Guiding%20Principles%20for%20Market%20Standards%20for%20Corporate%20Actions%20Pr
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 MSGM, available at:  
<http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/Market%20Standards%20for%20General%20Meetings.pdf> (date accessed: 
03-12-2015). 
80
 See MSGM, p. 9. 
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CAJWG standards, available at: <http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/european-industry-standards/> (date accessed 11-
11-2015).  
82
 See CAJWG standards, p. 4.  
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
29 
  
account because they constitute the source of almost any subsequent corporate action
83
. 
The MSGM are built upon a basic structure. They standardise the information flow, the 
content of information and the sequence of events. Three general principles dominate: 
Firstly, the information regarding the general meeting must reach the end investor through 
the intermediated chain. Secondly, if the end investor does not wish to receive such 
information, he can opt out for any category of meetings and the last intermediary is 
released from his duty
84
. Thirdly, for all processes the abolishment of paper use is 
mandatory. The standards declare their compatibility with the SRD mentioned in chapter II 
and are structured in 3 processes: the meeting notice, the record date and entitlement, and 
the notification of participation.  
The meeting notice must be announced from the issuer to the end investor and circulate 
through the chain of intermediaries
85
. The reasoning behind this standard is that every 
market participant, involved in trading and settlement services, must be connected with 
CSDs in order to transmit the meeting notice so as to ultimately reach the end investor
86
. 
Intermediaries must provide a basic service which will be characterized by a reasonable cost. 
The meeting notice passes down the chain via ISO messages or other electronic means and 
its minimum content is also defined in the standards
87
. It must be noted though, that the 
MSGM do not oblige the last Intermediaries in the chain to establish electronic 
communication systems with end investors because they are built on the assumption that 
such systems exist or will exist in the near future
88
. The recommended sequence of days is 
represented below: 
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1 business day for the Issuer CSD to inform its participants  
 
 
       1 business day for Intermediaries  
 
                                     2 business days for End investor 
  
Picture 3: Deadlines for the meeting notice according to MSGM, standards 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7. 
  
Entitlement is determined on the record date and share blocking is not allowed. 
Nevertheless, the record date is not defined by MSGM. In all cases, the meeting notice must 
definitely mention the record date so as to activate promptly the facilitation of the voting 
process
89
. It is important to underline that national law will indicate the periods between the 
issuance of meeting notices and the record date, as well as the dates between the record 
date and the general meeting. The MSGM only set out the sequence, which is: issuance of 
meeting notice, record date, last intermediary deadline, issuer deadline and general 
meeting
90
. Furthermore, the entitlement does not require validation on every level of the 
chain
91
.  
During the process of notification of participation, the end investor informs of his 
involvement or not in the general meeting through a standardised system
92
. If it is requested 
by national law or the issuer, the notification of participation may contain contact details of 
the shareholder and
 
the end investor
93
. Although it is not obligatory to participate via 
notification of participation, when the end investor opts for it, the intermediaries must pass 
it on mandatorily within the following recommended deadlines:  
 
                                                     
89
 See E-MIG Workshop (n 86) p. 3. 
90
 See MSGM, standard 2.3. 
91
 See MSGM, standard 3.5. 
92
 See MSGM, standard 3.1. 
93
 See MSGM, Standard 3.10 (number 6) reads “The Notification of Participation should comprise at least the 
following: If required by the applicable law or if requested by the Issuer, identity and contact details of the 
Shareholder, if any, and End Investor”. 
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     Maximum 3 business days                        Maximum 2 business days  
 
Picture 4: Example of MSGM, standards 3.2 and 3.3.   
 
The first observation about the MSGM is that they generally establish efficiency in the 
intermediated chain. More importantly, it is the first set of harmonised standards that 
declare enforceable the rights of the end investor and promote them through the chain. 
Moreover, the MSGM use a simultaneous combination of the push and pull method for the 
meeting notice. They imply that the end investor will be notified by the intermediary (push 
method) in the meeting notice, in the context of which there will be a reference to the 
company’s website for detailed information (pull method). The use of agreed deadlines in 
the process creates market safety and legal certainty.  
 
1.1.2 Corporate Actions Joint Working Group standards (CAJWG standards) 
  
Corporate actions processing is deemed one of the most complex areas of post 
trading
94
. Post trading activities involve clearing and settlement of securities
95
. The latter 
plays a significant role in determining who should be addressed in a corporate action
96
. In a 
similar vein as the MSGM, the CAJWG standards place the investor in the centre of their 
reforms and are organized in two basic categories: corporate actions on stock and on flow.   
a) Corporate actions on stock regulate the processing of corporate actions that circulate 
normally through the intermediated chain and usually result in payment situations (e.g. 
distribution of cash or securities) or reorganisations
97
.  
                                                     
94
  See CAJWG standards, p. 3.  
95
 A securities transaction can basically be divided into two parts. The first part is the trading phase, in which 
the involved parties agree on the purchase conditions of a financial asset. The second phase is the post-trading, 
during which the obligations of the parties are formally calculated (clearing) and the transfer of the asset and 
the funds between seller and buyer is completed (settlement), see P. Inglesias-Rodriguez, The regulation of 
cross-border clearing and settlement in the European Union from a legitimacy perspective, European Business 
Organization Law Review, 2012, pp. 442-472.  
96
 P. Phillips in (n 78) p. 22. 
97
 For a technical definition see Rosen Ivanov, Corporate actions in T2S, T2S Special Series, Issue No 3, 
Frankfurt, January 2014, available at: 
Last intermediary 
deadline 
Issuer deadline General Meeting 
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The first basic principle of the CAJWG standards is built upon the flow of information. 
The issuer is the “golden source”, which informs its issuer CSD the details of any corporate 
action event, including the key dates
98
. The announcement of mandatory and elective 
corporate actions starts with the issuer, then goes to the issuer CSD, and intermediaries, 
until it reaches the end investor. The upstream flow of information follows the same pattern 
in order for the end investor to declare his choices for elective corporate actions to the 
issuer
99
. 
The second important component of the CAJWG standards is the agreement on key 
dates. The harmonisation of the sequence of key dates is very important because it actually 
determines who is entitled to participate in a corporate action event. Ex date is defined as 
the date when securities are traded without the rights attached to them and therefore, the 
buyer of the shares will not benefit from the income payment whereas record date 
determines entitlement for the corporate action
100
. The sequence of key dates is specified 
for particular types of corporate actions, such as distribution with options, mandatory 
reorganisations with options and voluntary reorganisations
101
. This component of CAJWG 
standards is of significant importance because it unravels issues related with ownership and 
trading of securities presented in chapter I. For example: 
 
 
 
  
   
Minimum two business days               Settlement cycle minus one business day        preferably one business day 
 
 
Picture 5: Sequence of key dates for securities and cash distributions.  
Source: CAJWG standards, p. 12.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/pdf/specser/T2S_SpecialSeries_issue3.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-
2015) p. 5. 
98
 The characterization “golden source” was given by Ben van der Velpen from ING Bank in the Summary 
Report of the Seminar on European Market Practices Standards for Corporate Actions & General Meetings, ING 
Bank, Budapest, 7 February 2012. 
99
The CAJWG standards adopt the so called “Christmas tree model”, see Rosen Ivanov (n 97) p. 6.
100
 See CAJWG standards, Glossary pp. 6-9.  
101
 See CAJWG standards, pp. 21-37. 
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As to operational processing, a standardised procedure contributes to the safety and the 
efficiency of the EU market. An example of automation, under the standards, is that all 
payments should be made by book entry. The communication in the intermediated chain 
will take place in the form of standardised messages, e.g. the ISO securities messaging 
standards
102
.  
 
b) Corporate actions on flow, also known as transaction management, control transaction 
failures that derive from the trading of securities
103
. Before the adoption of CAJWG 
standards market participants used different methods to manage such failures and 
usually did not use a centralised CSD mechanism
104
. The functionality of these standards 
is based on the fast and efficient exchange of information in the intermediated chain and 
results in i) market claims in distribution events, ii) transformations in reorganisations 
and iii) buyer protection in elective corporate actions.  
Market claims are created when the contractually entitled party has not received the 
underlying securities on the record date and a distribution event has been initiated. In this 
scenario, for shares the benchmark is the ex date. The seller must activate a claim and 
receive proceeds or cash if the trade took place before the ex date, whereas when the 
trading is pending on or after the ex date, the buyer has the right to file a market claim to 
the seller
105
. The claim is processed centrally by the CSD, which creates a separate 
transaction from the underlying transaction, as soon as possible and within a deadline of 20 
business days.  
In a transformation scenario, there will be pending transactions as a result of securities 
trading and new securities created due to a reorganisation event e.g. merger, acquisition or 
tender offer
106
. Any pending transaction must be cancelled and replaced in accordance with 
                                                     
102
  For ISO Standards see Corporate Actions, Enabling and improving event communications between public 
companies and their stakeholders, available at: 
<https://www.swift.com/assets/swift_com/documents/products_services/SWIFT_Corporate_Actions_infopape
r.pdf> (date accessed: 13-11-2015). 
103
 See P. Colladan in (n 78), p. 21.  
104
 T2S Corporate Action Sub Group, Market claims and transformations in T2S: Which CSD should identify 
them?, 09.04.01/2009/011713, Frankfurt, November 2009, available at: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/subcorpact/ca_key_market_claims.pdf?c6e54103e99d8
0e1cc5e9250366eba08>  (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 1.  
105
 See CAJWG standards, p. 42. 
106
 See CAJWG standards, p. 8. 
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new terms because the reorganisation implies a change in the old ISIN of the securities
107
. 
The CSD, once again should proceed to the transformation and replacement.  
Finally, buyer protection refers to elective corporate actions in which the buyer has not 
received the securities yet, however, he has the right to pass instructions to the seller. A 
buyer protection can involve significant market exposure for both parties and therefore a 
rapid exchange of information between the buyer and the seller will ensure that the issuer 
deadline has not expired (see picture 4)
108
. Within the market infrastructure, buyer 
protection may take two forms: one is automated and the other is manual. The automated 
buyer protection takes place via the intermediated chain within a specific deadline of one 
business day before the issuer deadline. The settlement of this transaction will be extended 
until the instruction of the buyer reaches the issuer. On the contrary, a bi-lateral agreement 
between the respective trading parties constitutes a manual buyer protection. Market 
standards establish that the buyer protection deadline should be identical for the same 
transaction within the EU. 
The significance of the market standards is linked with its all inclusive membership: all 
parties in the securities industry are represented, with a convergence of relevant European 
trade associations, issuers, market infrastructures for trading, clearing, settlement and 
safekeeping of securities, financial intermediaries and end-investors
109
. Furthermore, the 
creation of these market standards does not remain on a theoretical level, but there is a 
collective action for their implementation on a national and European level. There are 
national Market Implementation Groups (MIGs) with the target to ensure the proper 
performance of the standards and report to the European Market Implementation Group (E-
MIG). Moreover, the organisational structure implies that the E-MIG reports to the BSG, 
which is responsible for transmitting information to the European Commission regarding the 
implementation status of market standards across the EU.
110
. Hence, this hierarchical 
                                                     
107
 International Securities Identification Number is the 12-character code that serves to uniform identification 
of a security at trading and settlement.  
108
 Market Standards for Corporate Actions Processing Question & Answer Document, 21 March 2014, available 
at: <www.afme.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12415> (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 12. 
109
 European Commission, Info-letter on post-trading, Unit MARKT/G2, Issue 3, Brussels, July 2011, available at: 
<http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/European%20Commission%20Info-letter%20on%20post-trading%20-
%20Issue%203%20-%20July%202011.pdf> (date accessed: 03-12-2015) p. 16.  
110
 Broad Stakeholder Group (BSG), Dismantling Giovannini Barrier 3: The Market Standards for Corporate 
Actions Processing & General Meetings: Third Implementation progress report, CB (EBF) D1174B-2011, Munich, 
June 2011, available at: http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/D1174B-2011-
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structure indicates that market standards constitute an instrument of soft law which is of 
significant importance while their implementation is monitored by serious committees.    
 
2. An overview of TARGET2-Securities: the pan European Settlement 
platform  
 
TARGET2-Securities (hereinafter T2S) is a single pan-European platform created to 
harmonise and facilitate the settlement of securities transactions within the EU and is 
already operational since June 2015. It is a technical platform based on the TARGET2 
payment system
111
 which provides a computer programme for central securities 
depositories, central banks, custodians and other intermediaries to process their respective 
transfers and record their respective securities holdings
112
. One of the key features of T2S is 
that it is not profit-driven but on a cost recovery basis
113
. Hence, cost reductions will lead to 
an increase in securities trading as issuers will have access to foreign investors and investors 
will have the possibility to invest in T2S-eligible securities in the same way as they do in 
domestic securities
114
. Although it is in the CSDs’ discretion to participate in the project, it 
already counts 24 participating CSDs and more are to follow
115
. It is important to underline 
that the T2S platform is not a single CSD but a common technical location, with the CSDs 
maintaining full legal responsibility and custody functions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
<BSG%20implementation%20progress%20report%20to%20the%20EC%20on%20Giovannini%20Barrier%203-
%20June%202011.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 2.  
111
 General Principle 2 of T2S available at: 
 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/2011_t2s_general_principles.pdf> (date accessed: 13-
11-2015).  TARGET2 is the second generation payment system replaced TARGET in May 2008. The initial 
TARGET stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer system. It is the 
real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system owned and operated by the Eurosystem. It plays a key role in 
ensuring the smooth conduct of monetary policy, banking and financial stability. For more information see: 
<www.target2.eu> (date accessed: 13-11-2015). 
112
 E. Micheler (n 16) pp. 24-25. 
113
 P. Athanassiou, T2 Securities: an overview of the Eurosystem’s aims and competence, Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation, 2008, p. 2.   
114
 M. Papenfuß, in M. Manaa T2S: from issuer to investor, T2S Special Series, Issue No 4, Frankfurt, September 
2014, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/pdf/specser/T2S_SpecialSeries_issue4.pdf (date 
accessed: 13-12-2015) p. 14. 
115
 The CSDs that participate in T2S programme can be found at: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/stakeholders/csd/html/index.en.html> (date accessed 13-11-2015). 
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2.1 What does TARGET2-Securities mean for corporate actions 
 
 T2S is a settlement engine and corporate actions that result in payments will be 
processed through T2S. Therefore, income distribution such as the payment of dividends or 
other proceeds, are directly relevant to the T2S project, where they involve settlement of 
securities
116
. The efficiency of this settlement platform becomes more obvious in pending 
transactions and settlement failures. Any risk of processing incorrect transactions is reduced 
because the participating CSDs exchange information in a common technical location and 
thus there will be no gaps in the communication between them
117
.  
 On the other hand, corporate actions related to voting processes and shareholder 
identification do not fall within the main remit of T2S and therefore, T2S does not regulate 
such transmission of information. It was negatively commented that “as T2S may lead to 
more cross border settlement and more cross border transactions, this will mean less access 
to information for issuers, and so companies will continue to lose information on their 
shareholder base as it becomes more international”
118
. To avoid such circumstances, the T2S 
community urged for the conformity to the already mentioned CAJWG Standards and 
required the compliance with the market standards as a prerequisite for a CSD to join in the 
T2S programme. In addition, T2S gave priority to the creation of a harmonised framework in 
the management of pending transactions
119
. More specifically, the Corporate Actions Sub-
Group (CASG) developed the T2S Corporate Action Standards (hereinafter T2S CA standards) 
which were approved by the T2S Advisory Group in 2009
120
. Hence, the significance of T2S is 
based on the fact that it imposed rapidly the standardisation of corporate actions as a 
requirement for the CSDs which desired to participate in the platform
121
.  
 
                                                     
116
 N. Rachman, M. Vermaas, noter-up Chapter 6, T. Keijser (ed) Transnational Securities Law, Oxford University 
Press, May 2015, GENERAL NOTER-UP 1, par. N-6-9.  
117
 P. Phillips in (n 78) p. 22. 
118
 S. Haan, in M. Manaa (n 114) p. 24. 
119
 See priority 6 of T2S activities available at: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/harmonisation/activities/html/index.en.html> (date accessed: 13-11-
2015).  
120
 For more information visit: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/governance/ag/html/subcorpact/index.en.html> (date accessed: 13-
11-2015).  
121
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2.2 TARGET2-Securities corporate action standards 
 
The T2S CA standards are standards on flow and deal with pending transactions
122
. They 
are structured in the same manner as the CAJWG standards and are divided into market 
claims, transformations and buyer protection. Firstly, it is important to refer to a new 
concept applicable to T2S CA Standards, the instruction owner CSD (IOC). The IOC is defined 
in simple terms as the central CSD that is always aware of the pending transactions of its 
own participants in T2S
123
. There are always two IOCs per transaction. In the T2S CA 
standards, IOCs should be responsible for detecting and instructing market claims and 
transformations.  The concept of IOC basically implies that the T2S platform is able to settle 
transactions with CSDs that participate in the programme as domestic ones
124
. Therefore, 
the characterisation of T2S as “an electronic highway” between all the participants of the 
intermediated chain is particularly felicitous and definitely improves corporate actions 
processing
125
. The T2S buyer protection standards basically follow the CAJWG standards, 
without introducing new concepts and terms. There is no obligation for a CSD in T2S to 
provide buyer protection services for its domestic securities. Nevertheless, this obligation is 
generated when the CSD decided to act as an investor CSD to a market in which the issuer 
CSD provides buyer protection. In this circumstance, it can choose to provide either the 
automated or the manual buyer protection
126
. 
 
3. Conclusions  
 
The analysis shows that market participants attempted to create communication 
channels and to provide efficiency in the intermediated chain. The recognition of the end 
investor as the primary source of corporate actions is significant. Subsequently, the ECB 
rewarded this attempt by approving and incorporating these standards in T2S. However, T2S 
                                                     
122
 T2S Corporate Action Standards, Market Claims (n 74) p. 3. 
123
 T2S Corporate Action Standards, Market Claims (n 74) p. 5.  
124
 T2S Corporate Action Sub Group (n 104) p. 5.  
125
 Colladan (n 78) p. 20. 
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 European Central Bank, Implementation of the T2S buyer protection Standards: Is it mandatory or not?, 
09.04.01/2012/002600, Frankfurt, March 2012,  available at: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/ag/mtg17/item-6-2-annex-1-implementation-of-the-
buyer-protection-standards-mandatory-or-not.pdf?21c98248565a98c6ab42fd7b2393362b> (date accessed: 
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is simply the beginning of the story. It was appropriately commented that “it is just a pipe 
and the most important things are at each end and what goes through it, not the pipe 
itself”
127
. The T2S structure urgently combined an IT and regulatory change to drive its 
harmonisation effort in the form of the establishment of a common settlement platform 
with the compliance to the market standards by all participating CSDs. However, it should be 
remembered that market standards are simply a set of solutions created by the industry 
with the target to smooth corporate action processing and to provide efficiency in 
intermediated chains
128
. They merely constitute an industry guide and not an automatic 
elimination of differences between European markets. On the positive side, however, the 
standards were endorsed by every market participant, and this in itself is a great 
achievement. 
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Chapter IV: The way forward: the interaction between legislation, 
market standards and T2S standards 
 
The presentation of efforts by different institutions and market players and from 
different angles raises the question; is there finally a common pathway for the 
harmonisation of corporate actions within the EU? This chapter will provide a comparative 
analysis of the harmonisation approaches and will conclude with recommendations for the 
creation of a real integrated EU securities market.  
 
1. The existing regulatory framework and market reality 
 
Summarising the analysis presented in the previous chapters, the Commission’s steps 
towards the harmonisation of corporate actions are to some extent related to the industry 
standards. In principle, the MSGM declare that they follow the SRD. Indeed, they contain 
common provisions. The SRD does not distinguish between foreign and domestic 
shareholders and MSGM are consistent with this structure
129
. A core component of the SRD 
is the exercise of voting rights by electronic means and likewise MSGM recommend the 
abolishment of paper use. Additionally, each of them eliminates share blocking mechanisms 
and settles the record date as the only reliable moment for a shareholder’s authentication. 
With regard to the information prior to the general meeting, the SRD declares that the 
issuance of the convocation should not be subjected to any specific cost for shareholders 
and the MSGM respect this principle
130
. The minimum content of information transmitted 
prior to the general meeting presents similarities in both texts
131
. Finally, they both propose 
push and pull methods in the downstream flow of information. 
However, a core contrast between the two texts is that the SRD does not provide rules 
that establish a link between the issuer and the end investor. On the other hand, the MSGM 
describe in detail how the meeting notice will reach the end investor, and therefore they 
explicitly recognise investor’s involvement in corporate action processing. Another antithesis 
is that the SRD provides minimum harmonisation, leaving the time between key dates to the 
                                                     
129
 See MSGM, p. 6. 
130
 See article 5 (3) of SRD and MSGM, p. 10. 
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discretion of national laws whereas the MSGM recommend specific deadlines for the 
dissemination of information concerning the general meeting. The complete process of 
receiving information for a general meeting may be avoided in MSGM because the investor 
is given the right to choose for an opt-out scheme if he does not wish to receive meeting 
notices, while in SRD there is no such arrangement
132
.  
The proposed revision of the SRD converges with the market standards as it reflects the 
flow of information similar to MSGM and CAJWG standards
133
. Hence, both instruments 
promote the facilitation of voting rights through the chain. However, the beneficiary of the 
chain differs as market standards chains terminate at the end investor whereas the revision 
of SRD does not define who act as shareholders and provides reference to national 
provisions of member states. 
The general standpoint of the MSGM and the proposed revision of the SRD is clearly 
different; whereas the MSGM focus on the efficiency of the intermediated chain, the 
revision of the SRD underlines that intermediated holding chains act as significant obstacles 
to shareholder engagement. For this reason, the revision of the SRD introduced an optional 
direct communication between issuers and shareholders that skips the custody chain. The 
fact that market standards included a similar identification process required under national 
law or by the issuer was not enough to smooth this contrast
134
. Another example that 
strengthens the juxtaposition between the two texts is that MSGM with the opt-out 
provision give an optional character to the participation in general meetings and thus 
cultivate a passive shareholder status, whereas the revision of the SRD focuses on direct 
channels of communication between issuer-shareholder with the objective to achieve higher 
shareholders’ engagement in general meetings. Additionally, the proposed revision of SRD 
obliges intermediaries to confirm cast votes in order to prevent voting misuse. Market 
standards do not include a similar provision as the EBF considers it to be completely 
unnecessary and costly
135
. Finally, the Commission observes that price discrimination acts as 
a barrier to the internal market and imposes transparency requirements to the pricing of 
intermediaries for cross-border transmission of information. On the contrary, market 
                                                     
132
 See MSGM, p. 9.  
133
 See article 3b and c of the proposed revision of SRD, MSGM, standards 1.1, 1.6, 1.7 and CAJWG standards, 
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standards do not require public disclosure of prices and fees and the establishment of the 
opt-out scheme provides a minimization of costs by the non transmission of information to 
the end investor.  
Comparing the ECB’s actions to the Commission’s approach, the conclusion is the same, 
because the T2S Corporate action standards are based on the industry standards for 
corporate actions on stock and on flow. The T2S CA standards, thus take the efficiency of the 
intermediated chain as a basis and therefore they perpetuate the current market 
infrastructure which relies on non-transparent intermediation
136
.   
Hence, the analysis indicates that, the market standards interact positively with the SRD 
and go one step further by improving the information process in the custody chain. However 
the proposed revision of the SRD tends to establish a more transparent system with the 
elimination of indirect communication between the issuer and the shareholder, even if the 
end investor is not included in the concept of shareholder in all Member States. Commission 
proposes transparency requirements and this is opposed to the maintenance of the current 
regime and its long intermediated chains. This juxtaposition leaves a big question mark 
regarding the future of the harmonisation of corporate actions. Should public authorities 
legislate upon the industry standards, instead of introducing new legal obligations which are 
incompatible with market reality? We must not forget that market standards have been 
endorsed by all market participants and the application of these reforms would create a 
completely different regime in today’s custody chain.   
 
2. Recommendations  
 
The desired harmonised framework within the EU is hindered by the intermediated 
system. The structure of securities holding systems is both a technical and a legal issue. 
Therefore, it would be much more efficient to begin the harmonisation by restructuring the 
system and eradicating all these long, cross-border chains. The position of this thesis is that a 
structural reform is needed and as the Commission’s Green Paper has correctly pointed out: 
we must start by creating a common property model in securities in order to build a Capital 
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Markets Union
137
.  This structural reform does not rely on the efficiency of the custody 
chains but on a transparent system that directly links the issuers and the ultimate 
investors
138
.  
Let’s imagine now how corporate actions would be processed in this transparent model 
which would assure that shareholders in the European Union can exercise their rights 
directly vis-à-vis the issuer
139
. In line with the Green Paper’s observation regarding 
technology, the EU must take into consideration IT developments and create one central 
electronic system that would hold and transfer securities for all European jurisdictions and 
that system would be accessible directly by the ultimate account holders, being recognised 
as shareholders and having direct and unshared ownership on their securities. Shareholders 
would exercise their voting rights electronically via the company’s website after receiving an 
electronic certification code. Problems related to overvoting and costly processes for the 
transmission of meeting notices and deadlines therefore would disappear. Accordingly, 
payments of dividends and other proceeds would be simplified drastically and transfer 
failures would not occur as the information in the share registry would be easily and 
continuously up to date.  
Diverging implementation within the EU and the possible refusal of member states to 
abandon their current property models on securities, would render the abovementioned 
recommendation useless. For this reason and in addition, I recommend a legal reform on the 
basis of a European regulation that will target to provide an amicable solution between the 
efficiency of the intermediated chain and transparency requirements. Only a regulation will 
create a directly applicable common EU language so that all intermediaries can 
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communicate within EU using the same tactics and terminology in the processing of 
corporate actions
140
. The scope of this regulation must be extended to all issuers, CSDs and 
intermediaries that offer services in the European territory
141
. The substance of this 
regulation will focus on harmonising collectively all corporate actions processing and must 
include the following suggestions. Firstly, the regulation must acknowledge the end 
investor’s voting rights, whichever property model is applied along the chain and at least 
create a homogenous direct voting procedure via internet means. Furthermore, it must 
declare mandatory the “know your costumer” standards in order to create transparency in 
the intermediated chain and it must establish that intermediaries are responsible for any 
dolus or negligence based liability. The regulation will select a certain type of ISO messaging 
and all intermediaries will be obliged to follow it for the communication through the chain. 
T2S corporate actions for transaction management should be incorporated in this regulation 
in order to create a common framework for possible transaction realignments. Finally, the 
regulation will envisage clear sanctions for any participant failing to comply with it. This 
regulation will standardise corporate actions wholistically by weighting both a modern and 
synchronized voting process and the already established communication channels created 
by market standards for distributions, reorganizations and elective corporate actions.  
  
                                                     
140
 The recent EU terminology is Securities Law legislation, see <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/financial-
markets/securities-law/index_en.htm> (date accessed: 18-01-2015). 
141
 And therefore to any third country intermediary that offers services within EU.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
EU key actors including the Commission and market participants, although being active 
in harmonising corporate actions, did not manage to create a sufficient level of 
harmonisation until today. However, the Commission has detected the root of the problem 
and this is extremely positive. This thesis recommends the adoption of a transparent model. 
Even if this might seem rather utopian because of political and market participants’ vested 
interests that hold the intermediated systems into existence until today, it should be noted 
that technology is innovating and expanding at an exponential growth rate and societies are 
redefined continuously. The same path must follow the EU financial architecture in order to 
benefit from the IT world and become increasingly robust. We must not forget that the 
accumulated value represented in securities derives from the end investor. The aftermath of 
the financial crisis shows that a safe market is based on increased liquidity and this is only 
attached when the end investor trusts the financial system. A safe and harmonised EU 
securities market implies that all corporate actions must be processed in the context of a 
transparent system because only then markets work for the real economy and systemic risks 
are prevented.   
 
 
  
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
45 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Books 
 
Chun C. ‘The Intermediated System in the European Union’, in Cross-border Transactions of 
Intermediated Securities: A Comparative analysis in Substantive law and Private International 
Law, Springer, 2012, pp. 113-155.  
 
Conac P. H., ‘Rights of the Investor’, in Conac P. H., Segna U. and Thévenoz L. (ed), 
Intermediated Securities: The impact of the Geneva Securities Convention and the Future 
European Legislation, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 105-132.  
 
Keijser T., ‘Transactions in Securities’, in Goode R., Kronke H., and McKendrick E. (ed), 
Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases, and Material, Second Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, pp. 425-457.  
 
Payne J., ‘Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK’, in Gullifer L., Payne J. 
(ed), Intermediated securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues, Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 
187-216. 
 
Rachman N., Vermaas M., ‘Corporate Actions in the Intermediated System: Bridging the Gap 
between Issuer and Investor’, in Keijser T. (ed), Transnational Securities Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 145-167. 
  
Renebogg L., Szilaguyi P. ‘Shareholder engagement at European general meetings’, in 
Belcredi M.  , Ferrarini G. (ed), Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies, Facts, 
Context and Post-crisis Reforms, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 315-364.  
 
Simmons M. and Dalgleish E., Corporate Actions: A Guide to Securities Event Management, 
John Wiley & Sons, 2006. 
 
 
Articles  
 
Athanassiou P., T2 Securities: an overview of the Eurosystem’s aims and competence, 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2008, pp. 585-594. 
 
Dijkhuizen T., Report from Europe: The Proposal for a Directive Amending the Shareholders 
Rights Directive, European Company Law, 12/1, 2015, pp. 45-50.  
 
Hainsworth A., The Shareholders Rights Directive and the challenge of refinancing beneficial 
shareholders, Law and Financial Markets Review, 11, 2007, pp. 11-20. 
 
Inglesias-Rodriguez P., The regulation of cross-border clearing and settlement in the 
European Union from a legitimacy perspective, European Business Organization Law Review, 
2012, pp. 442-472. 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
46 
 
 
Kahan M., E. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, The Georgetown Law Journal, 
Vol. 96, 2008, pp. 1229-1281. 
 
Latella D., Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Comparative Analysis and the Implications of the 
European Shareholders’ Rights Directive, European Company and Financial Law Review, 
2/2009, pp. 1-17. 
 
Masouros P., Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously?: An Essay on the Impotence of 
Shareholdership in Corporate Europe, European Company Law, Vol. 7, Issue 5, October 2010, 
available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686725> (date 
accessed: 06-12-2015) pp. 195-203. 
 
Rose C., The new European Shareholder Rights Directive: Removing barriers and creating 
opportunities for more shareholder activism and democracy, Springer Science+Business 
Media, May 2010, pp. 269-284.  
 
TARGETing corporate actions, A panel of experts assesses the potential effects of TARGET2-
Securities on corporate actions in Europe, and what Asia is doing to catch up, Asset servicing 
times, 29 SEP - 02 OCT, SIBOS 2014, available at: 
<http://www.assetservicingtimes.com/specialistfeatures/specialistfeature.php?specialist_id
=80#.VmXYVLiLRdh> (date accessed 13-11-2015) pp. 20-28. 
 
Zetzsche D., Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the Shareholder Rights Directive, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, CBC-RPS No. 0031, 2008, pp. 1-60. 
 
 
Reports 
 
Broad Stakeholder Group (BSG), Dismantling Giovannini Barrier 3: The Market Standards for 
Corporate Actions Processing & General Meetings: Third Implementation progress report, CB 
(EBF) D1174B-2011, Munich, June 2011. 
 
CESAME Report, Solving the industry Giovannini Barriers to post-trading within the EU, 
Brussels, November 2008.  
 
European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement 
of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements 
of the corporate governance statement, SWD(2014) 127 final, Brussels, April 2014.  
 
European Commission, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 
Brussels, 5 April 2011.  
 
European Corporate Governance Forum, Annual Report 2006, February 2007.  
 
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
47 
  
Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe, Final Report: Cross-Border Voting in Europe, 
WODC no. 2002/ 6, The Hague, 2002.  
 
Myners Paul, Review of the Impediments to voting UK shares, Report to the Shareholder 
Voting Working Group, London, March 2005.  
 
 
Working Papers and other material  
 
Böckli et al., Shareholder Engagement and Identification (February 23, 2015). Available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568741> (date accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
Donald D.C., The rise and effect of the Indirect Holding System, September 2007. 
 
European Banking Federation, EBF Position Paper On the Commission’s Proposal for a 
Directive amending the Shareholders’ Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) of 9 April 2014 
- COM(2014) 213 final, Brussels, October 2014.  
 
European Central Bank, Building a Capital Markets Union – Eurosystem contribution to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper, Frankfurt, 2015.  
 
European Central Bank, Implementation of the T2S buyer protection Standards: Is it 
mandatory or not?, 09.04.01/2012/002600, Frankfurt, March 2012. 
 
European Commission, Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final, 
Brussels, February 2015. 
 
European Commission, Info-letter on post-trading, Unit MARKT/G2, Issue 3, Brussels, July 
2011. 
 
European Commission, Legislation on legal certainty of securities holdings and dispositions, 
Consultation Document of the services of the Directorate-General Internal market and 
services, DG Markt G2 MET/OT/acg D (2010) 768690, Brussels, 2010. 
 
European Securities and Market Authority, ESMA response to the Commission Green Paper 
on Building a Capital Markets Union, 2015/ESMA/856, Paris, May 2015.  
 
Faulkner M. C., An Introduction to Securities Lending, Spitalfields Advisors Limited, fourth 
edition, London, 2007, available at: 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/gilts/slcgjun05.pdf> (date accessed: 
13-12-2015).  
 
FIN-USE Expert Forum of Financial Services Users, Response to public consultation on 
Shareholders’ Rights, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-
use_forum/docs/opinion2_en.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
48 
 
Giovannini Group, Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European 
Union, Brussels, November 2001. 
 
Ivanov R., Corporate actions in T2S, T2S Special Series, Issue No 3, Frankfurt, January 2014. 
 
Latham & Watkins LLP, Empty Voting and Other Fault Lines Undermining Shareholder 
Democracy: The New Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds, M &A Deal Commentary, April 2007, 
available at: 
<https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1878_1.Commentary.Empty.Voting.pdf
>  (date accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
Legal Certainty Group, Second Advice of the Legal Certainty Group, Solutions to Legal Barriers 
related to Post-Trading within the EU, Brussels, August 2008.  
 
Manaa M. T2S: from issuer to investor, T2S Special Series, Issue No 4, Frankfurt, September 
2014.  
 
Micheler E., Custody Chains and Remoteness - Disconnecting Investors from Issuers, March 
2014, available at SSRN:  
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413025> (date accessed: 12-12-
2015).  
 
Micheler E., Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty, (February 10, 2014), LSE Legal 
Studies Working Paper No. 3/2014, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336889> 
(date accessed: 13-12-2015). 
 
Oxera, Corporate action processing: what are the risks?, May 2004,  available at: 
<www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/WhitePapers/oxera_2004.pdf> (date accessed: 
13-12-2015).  
 
Paech P., Cross-border Issues of securities Law: European efforts to support securities 
markets with a coherent legal framework, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy, European Parliament, Brussels, 2011.  
 
T2S Advisory Group, T2S Corporate actions standards – Buyer Protection, 
09.04.01/2013/004653, Frankfurt, May 2013. 
 
T2S Advisory Group, T2S Corporate actions standards – Market claims, 
09.04.01/2013/004654, Frankfurt, May 2013.  
 
T2S Advisory Group, T2S Corporate actions standards – Transformations, 
09.04.01/2014/001419, Frankfurt, January 2014.  
 
T2S Corporate Action Sub Group, Market claims and transformations in T2S: Which CSD 
should identify them?, 09.04.01/2009/011713, Frankfurt, November 2009. 
 
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
49 
  
UNIDROIT, Working paper regarding so called “Transparent Systems”, Study LXXVIII – Doc. 
44, Rome, November 2006, available at: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2006/study78/s-78-044-e.pdf> (date 
accessed: 10-12-2015).  
 
 
Legislation  
 
Directive 2004/109/EC 
Directive 2007/36/EC 
Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement 
and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance 
statement, COM (2014) 213 final, Brussels, 9.4.2014. 
 
 
Industry standards 
 
E-MIG Workshop on the implementation of the Market Standards for General Meetings, 
Brussels, 9-10 November 2011, available at: <http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/E-MIG-
Summary-Report-Workshop-Nov-2011.pdf> (date accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
Market Standards for corporate actions processing, 2012, available at: <http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/european-industry-standards/> (date accessed 11-11-2015).  
 
Market Standards for Corporate Actions Processing & for General Meetings, Guiding 
Principles, available at: <http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/Guiding%20Principles%20for%20Market%20Standards%20for%20Corporate
%20Actions%20Processing%20%20General%20Meetings.pdf> (date accessed: 12-11-2015). 
 
Market Standards for Corporate Actions Processing Question & Answer Document, 21 March 
2014, available at: <www.afme.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12415> (date 
accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
Market Standards on General Meetings, 2010, available at:  
<http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/Market%20Standards%20for%20General%20Meetings.pdf> (date accessed: 
03-12-2015). 
 
Market Standards on General Meetings, Frequently asked questions, 12 March 2010, 
available at: <http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/Market%20Standards%20for%20General%20Meetings%20-%20FAQs.pdf> 
(date accessed: 13-12-2015). 
 
 
 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
50 
 
Web pages 
 
<http://www.corporate-actions.net/Events.html> (date accessed: 13-12-2015).   
CESAME2 Group: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/financial-markets/clearing/cesame/index_en.htm> (date 
accessed 10-11-2015). 
 
Market Standards:  
<http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/european-industry-standards/> (date accessed: 13-12-2015).  
 
For TARGET2: <www.target2.eu> (date accessed: 13-12-2015). 
 
T2S Corporate Action Standards: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/governance/ag/html/subcorpact/index.en.html> 
(date accessed: 13-12-2015). 
  
Thomais Kotta Kyriakou 
The Harmonisation of Corporate Actions in the EU Securities Markets 
 
 
51 
  
APPENDIX 
I.  SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS DIRECTIVE. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2007/36/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL 
of 11 July 2007 
on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 
44 and 95 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty, 
Whereas: 
(1) In its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 21 May 2003, 
entitled ‘Modernising Company Law and enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union — A Plan to Move Forward’, the Commission indicated that new tailored 
initiatives should be taken with a view to enhancing shareholders’ rights in listed 
companies and that problems relating to cross-border voting should be solved as a matter 
of urgency. 
(2) In its Resolution of 21 April 2004, the European Parliament expressed its support for the 
Commission’s intention to strengthen shareholders’ rights, in particular through the 
extension of the rules on transparency, proxy voting rights, the possibility of participating 
in general meetings via electronic means and ensuring that cross-border voting rights are 
able to be exercised. 
(3) Holders of shares carrying voting rights should be able to exercise those rights given that 
they are reflected in the price that has to be paid at the acquisition of the shares. 
Furthermore, effective shareholder control is a pre-requisite to sound corporate governance 
and should, therefore, be facilitated and encouraged. It is therefore necessary to adopt 
measures to approximate the laws of the Member States to this end. Obstacles which deter 
shareholders from voting, such as making the exercise of voting rights subject to the 
blocking of shares during a certain period before the general meeting, should be removed. 
However, this Directive does not affect existing Community legislation on units issued by 
collective investment undertakings or on units acquired or disposed of in such 
undertakings. 
(4) The existing Community legislation is not sufficient to achieve this objective. Directive 
2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the 
admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be 
published on those securities focuses on the information issuers have to disclose to the 
market and accordingly does not deal with the shareholder voting process itself. Moreover, 
Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
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2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market imposes on issuers 
an obligation to make available certain information and documents relevant to general 
meetings, but such information and documents are to be made available in the issuer’s 
home Member State. Therefore, certain minimum standards should be introduced with a 
view to protecting investors and promoting the smooth and effective exercise of 
shareholder rights attaching to voting shares. As regards rights other than the right to vote, 
Member States are free to extend the application of these minimum standards also to non-
voting shares, to the extent that those shares do not enjoy such standards already. 
(5) Significant proportions of shares in listed companies are held by shareholders who do not 
reside in the Member State in which the company has its registered office. Non-resident 
shareholders should be able to exercise their rights in relation to the general meeting as 
easily as shareholders who reside in the Member State in which the company has its 
registered office. This requires that existing obstacles which hinder the access of non-
resident shareholders to the information relevant to the general meeting and the exercise of 
voting rights without physically attending the general meeting be removed. The removal of 
these obstacles should also benefit resident shareholders who do not or cannot attend the 
general meeting. 
(6) Shareholders should be able to cast informed votes at, or in advance of, the general 
meeting, no matter where they reside. All shareholders should have sufficient time to 
consider the documents intended to be submitted to the general meeting and determine 
how they will vote their shares. To this end, timely notice should be given of the general 
meeting, and shareholders should be provided with the complete information intended to 
be submitted to the general meeting. The possibilities which modern technologies offer to 
make information instantly accessible should be exploited. This Directive presupposes that 
all listed companies already have an Internet site. 
(7) Shareholders should, in principle, have the possibility to put items on the agenda of the 
general meeting and to table draft resolutions for items on the agenda. Without prejudice to 
different time-frames and modalities which are currently in use across the Community, the 
exercise of those rights should be made subject to two basic rules, namely that any 
threshold required for the exercise of those rights should not exceed 5 % of the company’s 
share capital and that all shareholders should in every case receive the final version of the 
agenda in sufficient time to prepare for the discussion and voting on each item on the 
agenda. 
(8) Every shareholder should, in principle, have the possibility to ask questions related to 
items on the agenda of the general meeting and to have them answered, while the rules on 
how and when questions are to be asked and answered should be left to be determined by 
Member States. 
(9) Companies should face no legal obstacles in offering to their shareholders any means of 
electronic participation in the general meeting. Voting without attending the general 
meeting in person, whether by correspondence or by electronic means, should not be 
subject to constraints other than those necessary for the verification of identity and the 
security of electronic communications. However, this should not prevent Member States 
from adopting rules aimed at ensuring that the results of the voting reflect the intentions of 
the shareholders in all circumstances, including rules aimed at addressing situations where 
new circumstances occur or are revealed after a shareholder has cast his vote by 
correspondence or by electronic means. 
(10) Good corporate governance requires a smooth and effective process of proxy voting. 
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Existing limitations and constraints which make proxy voting cumbersome and costly 
should therefore be removed. But good corporate governance also requires adequate 
safeguards against a possible abuse of proxy voting. The proxy holder should therefore be 
bound to observe any instructions he may have received from the shareholder and 
Member States should be able to introduce appropriate measures ensuring that the proxy 
holder does not pursue any interest other than that of the shareholder, irrespective of the 
reason that has given rise to the conflict of interests. Measures against possible abuse 
may, in particular, consist of regimes which Member States may adopt in order to 
regulate the activity of persons who actively engage in the collection of proxies or who 
have in fact collected more than a certain significant number of proxies, notably to ensure 
an adequate degree of reliability and transparency. Shareholders have an unfettered right 
under this Directive to appoint such persons as proxy holders to attend and vote at general 
meetings in their name. This Directive does not, however, affect any rules or sanctions 
that Member States may impose on such persons where votes have been cast by making 
fraudulent use of proxies collected. Moreover, this Directive does not impose any 
obligation on companies to verify that proxy holders cast votes in accordance with the 
voting instructions of the appointing shareholders. 
(11) Where financial intermediaries are involved, the effectiveness of voting upon instructions 
relies, to a great extent, on the efficiency of the chain of intermediaries, given that 
investors are frequently unable to exercise the voting rights attached to their shares 
without the cooperation of every intermediary in the chain, who may not have an 
economic stake in the shares. In order to enable the investor to exercise his voting rights 
in cross-border situations, it is therefore important that intermediaries facilitate the 
exercise of voting rights. Further consideration should be given to this issue by the 
Commission in the context of a Recommendation, with a view to ensuring that investors 
have access to effective voting services and that voting rights are exercised in accordance 
with the instructions given by those investors. 
(12) While the timing of disclosure to the administrative, management or supervisory body as 
well as to the public of votes cast in advance of the general meeting electronically or by 
correspondence is an important matter of corporate governance, it can be determined by 
Member States. 
(13) Voting results should be established through methods that reflect the voting intentions 
expressed by shareholders, and they should be made transparent after the general meeting 
at least through the company’s Internet site. 
(14) Since the objective of this Directive, namely to allow shareholders effectively to make 
use of their rights throughout the Community, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States on the basis of the existing Community legislation and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale and effects of the measures, be better achieved at Community level, 
the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as 
set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as 
set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
achieve that objective. 
(15) In accordance with paragraph 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-
making, Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of 
the Community, their own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between 
this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 
Subject-matter and scope 
1.   This Directive establishes requirements in relation to the exercise of certain shareholder 
rights attaching to voting shares in relation to general meetings of companies which have their 
registered office in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market situated or operating within a Member State. 
2.   The Member State competent to regulate matters covered in this Directive shall be the 
Member State in which the company has its registered office, and references to the ‘applicable 
law’ are references to the law of that Member State. 
3.   Member States may exempt from this Directive the following types of companies: 
(a) collective investment undertakings within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 
85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS); 
(b) undertakings the sole object of which is the collective investment of capital provided by 
the public, which operate on the principle of risk spreading and which do not seek to take 
legal or management control over any of the issuers of their underlying investments, 
provided that these collective investment undertakings are authorised and subject to the 
supervision of competent authorities and that they have a depositary exercising functions 
equivalent to those under Directive 85/611/EEC; 
(c) cooperative societies. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply: 
(a) ‘regulated market’ means a market as defined in Article 4(1), point 14, of Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments; 
(b) ‘shareholder’ means the natural or legal person that is recognised as a shareholder under 
the applicable law; 
(c) ‘proxy’ means the empowerment of a natural or legal person by a shareholder to exercise 
some or all rights of that shareholder in the general meeting in his name. 
Article 3 
Further national measures 
This Directive shall not prevent Member States from imposing further obligations on 
companies or from otherwise taking further measures to facilitate the exercise by shareholders 
of the rights referred to in this Directive. 
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CHAPTER II 
GENERAL MEETINGS OF SHAREHOLDERS 
Article 4 
Equal treatment of shareholders 
The company shall ensure equal treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position 
with regard to participation and the exercise of voting rights in the general meeting. 
Article 5 
Information prior to the general meeting 
1.   Without prejudice to Articles 9(4) and 11(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids , Member States shall ensure 
that the company issues the convocation of the general meeting in one of the manners 
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article not later than on the 21st day before the day of the 
meeting. 
Member States may provide that, where the company offers the facility for shareholders to 
vote by electronic means accessible to all shareholders, the general meeting of shareholders 
may decide that it shall issue the convocation of a general meeting which is not an annual 
general meeting in one of the manners specified in paragraph 2 of this Article not later than 
on the 14th day before the day of the meeting. This decision is to be taken by a majority of 
not less than two thirds of the votes attaching to the shares or the subscribed capital 
represented and for a duration not later than the next annual general meeting. 
Member States need not apply the minimum periods referred to in the first and second 
subparagraphs for the second or subsequent convocation of a general meeting issued for lack 
of a quorum required for the meeting convened by the first convocation, provided that this 
Article has been complied with for the first convocation and no new item is put on the agenda, 
and that at least 10 days elapse between the final convocation and the date of the general 
meeting. 
2.   Without prejudice to further requirements for notification or publication laid down by the 
competent Member State as defined in Article 1(2), the company shall be required to issue the 
convocation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in a manner ensuring fast access to it on 
a non-discriminatory basis. The Member State shall require the company to use such media as 
may reasonably be relied upon for the effective dissemination of information to the public 
throughout the Community. The Member State may not impose an obligation to use only 
media whose operators are established on its territory. 
The Member State need not apply the first subparagraph to companies that are able to identify 
the names and addresses of their shareholders from a current register of shareholders, 
provided that the company is under an obligation to send the convocation to each of its 
registered shareholders. 
In either case the company may not charge any specific cost for issuing the convocation in the 
prescribed manner. 
3.   The convocation referred to in paragraph 1 shall at least: 
(a) indicate precisely when and where the general meeting is to take place, and the proposed 
agenda for the general meeting; 
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(b) contain a clear and precise description of the procedures that shareholders must comply 
with in order to be able to participate and to cast their vote in the general meeting. This 
includes information concerning: 
(i) the rights available to shareholders under Article 6, to the extent that those rights can be 
exercised after the issuing of the convocation, and under Article 9, and the deadlines by 
which those rights may be exercised; the convocation may confine itself to stating only 
the deadlines by which those rights may be exercised, provided it contains a reference to 
more detailed information concerning those rights being made available on the Internet 
site of the company; 
(ii) the procedure for voting by proxy, notably the forms to be used to vote by proxy and the 
means by which the company is prepared to accept electronic notifications of the 
appointment of proxy holders; and 
(iii) where applicable, the procedures for casting votes by correspondence or by electronic 
means; 
 
(c) where applicable, state the record date as defined in Article 7(2) and explain that only those 
who are shareholders on that date shall have the right to participate and vote in the general 
meeting; 
(d) indicate where and how the full, unabridged text of the documents and draft resolutions 
referred to in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 4 may be obtained; 
(e) indicate the address of the Internet site on which the information referred to in paragraph 4 
will be made available. 
4.   Member States shall ensure that, for a continuous period beginning not later than on the 
21 day before the day of the general meeting and including the day of the meeting, the 
company shall make available to its shareholders on its Internet site at least the following 
information: 
(a) the convocation referred to in paragraph 1; 
(b) the total number of shares and voting rights at the date of the convocation (including 
separate totals for each class of shares where the company’s capital is divided into two or 
more classes of shares); 
(c) the documents to be submitted to the general meeting; 
(d) a draft resolution or, where no resolution is proposed to be adopted, a comment from a 
competent body within the company, to be designated by the applicable law, for each item 
on the proposed agenda of the general meeting; moreover, draft resolutions tabled by 
shareholders shall be added to the Internet site as soon as practicable after the company has 
received them; 
(e) where applicable, the forms to be used to vote by proxy and to vote by correspondence, 
unless those forms are sent directly to each shareholder. 
Where the forms referred to in point (e) cannot be made available on the Internet for technical 
reasons, the company shall indicate on its Internet site how the forms can be obtained on 
paper. In this case the company shall be required to send the forms by postal services and free 
of charge to every shareholder who so requests. 
Where, pursuant to Articles 9(4) or 11(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC, or to the second 
subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article, the convocation of the general meeting is issued 
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later than on the 21st day before the meeting, the period specified in this paragraph shall be 
shortened accordingly. 
Article 6 
Right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting and to table draft resolutions 
1.   Member States shall ensure that shareholders, acting individually or collectively: 
(a) have the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting, provided that each such 
item is accompanied by a justification or a draft resolution to be adopted in the general 
meeting; and 
(b) have the right to table draft resolutions for items included or to be included on the agenda 
of a general meeting. 
Member States may provide that the right referred to in point (a) may be exercised only in 
relation to the annual general meeting, provided that shareholders, acting individually or 
collectively, have the right to call, or to require the company to call, a general meeting which 
is not an annual general meeting with an agenda including at least all the items requested by 
those shareholders. 
Member States may provide that those rights shall be exercised in writing (submitted by 
postal services or electronic means). 
2.   Where any of the rights specified in paragraph 1 is subject to the condition that the 
relevant shareholder or shareholders hold a minimum stake in the company, such minimum 
stake shall not exceed 5 % of the share capital. 
3.   Each Member State shall set a single deadline, with reference to a specified number of 
days prior to the general meeting or the convocation, by which shareholders may exercise the 
right referred to in paragraph 1, point (a). In the same manner each Member State may set a 
deadline for the exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1, point (b). 
4.   Member States shall ensure that, where the exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1, 
point (a) entails a modification of the agenda for the general meeting already communicated 
to shareholders, the company shall make available a revised agenda in the same manner as the 
previous agenda in advance of the applicable record date as defined in Article 7(2) or, if no 
record date applies, sufficiently in advance of the date of the general meeting so as to enable 
other shareholders to appoint a proxy or, where applicable, to vote by correspondence. 
Article 7 
Requirements for participation and voting in the general meeting 
1.   Member States shall ensure: 
(a) that the rights of a shareholder to participate in a general meeting and to vote in respect of 
any of his shares are not subject to any requirement that his shares be deposited with, or 
transferred to, or registered in the name of, another natural or legal person before the 
general meeting; and 
(b) that the rights of a shareholder to sell or otherwise transfer his shares during the period 
between the record date, as defined in paragraph 2, and the general meeting to which it 
applies are not subject to any restriction to which they are not subject at other times. 
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2.   Member States shall provide that the rights of a shareholder to participate in a general 
meeting and to vote in respect of his shares shall be determined with respect to the shares held 
by that shareholder on a specified date prior to the general meeting (the record date). 
Member States need not apply the first subparagraph to companies that are able to identify the 
names and addresses of their shareholders from a current register of shareholders on the day 
of the general meeting. 
3.   Each Member State shall ensure that a single record date applies to all companies. 
However, a Member State may set one record date for companies which have issued bearer 
shares and another record date for companies which have issued registered shares, provided 
that a single record date applies to each company which has issued both types of shares. The 
record date shall not lie more than 30 days before the date of the general meeting to which it 
applies. In implementing this provision and Article 5(1), each Member State shall ensure that 
at least eight days elapse between the latest permissible date for the convocation of the 
general meeting and the record date. In calculating that number of days those two dates shall 
not be included. In the circumstances described in Article 5(1), third subparagraph, however, 
a Member State may require that at least six days elapse between the latest permissible date 
for the second or subsequent convocation of the general meeting and the record date. In 
calculating that number of days those two dates shall not be included. 
4.   Proof of qualification as a shareholder may be made subject only to such requirements as 
are necessary to ensure the identification of shareholders and only to the extent that they are 
proportionate to achieving that objective. 
Article 8 
Participation in the general meeting by electronic means 
1.   Member States shall permit companies to offer to their shareholders any form of 
participation in the general meeting by electronic means, notably any or all of the following 
forms of participation: 
(a) real-time transmission of the general meeting; 
(b) real-time two-way communication enabling shareholders to address the general meeting 
from a remote location; 
(c) a mechanism for casting votes, whether before or during the general meeting, without the 
need to appoint a proxy holder who is physically present at the meeting. 
2.   The use of electronic means for the purpose of enabling shareholders to participate in the 
general meeting may be made subject only to such requirements and constraints as are 
necessary to ensure the identification of shareholders and the security of the electronic 
communication, and only to the extent that they are proportionate to achieving those 
objectives. 
This is without prejudice to any legal rules which Member States have adopted or may adopt 
concerning the decision-making process within the company for the introduction or 
implementation of any form of participation by electronic means. 
Article 9 
Right to ask questions 
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1.   Every shareholder shall have the right to ask questions related to items on the agenda of 
the general meeting. The company shall answer the questions put to it by shareholders. 
2.   The right to ask questions and the obligation to answer are subject to the measures which 
Member States may take, or allow companies to take, to ensure the identification of 
shareholders, the good order of general meetings and their preparation and the protection of 
confidentiality and business interests of companies. Member States may allow companies to 
provide one overall answer to questions having the same content. 
Member States may provide that an answer shall be deemed to be given if the relevant 
information is available on the company’s Internet site in a question and answer format. 
Article 10 
Proxy voting 
1.   Every shareholder shall have the right to appoint any other natural or legal person as a 
proxy holder to attend and vote at a general meeting in his name. The proxy holder shall enjoy 
the same rights to speak and ask questions in the general meeting as those to which the 
shareholder thus represented would be entitled. 
Apart from the requirement that the proxy holder possess legal capacity, Member States shall 
abolish any legal rule which restricts, or allows companies to restrict, the eligibility of persons 
to be appointed as proxy holders. 
2.   Member States may limit the appointment of a proxy holder to a single meeting, or to 
such meetings as may be held during a specified period. 
Without prejudice to Article 13(5), Member States may limit the number of persons whom a 
shareholder may appoint as proxy holders in relation to any one general meeting. However, if 
a shareholder has shares of a company held in more than one securities account, such 
limitation shall not prevent the shareholder from appointing a separate proxy holder as 
regards shares held in each securities account in relation to any one general meeting. This 
does not affect rules prescribed by the applicable law that prohibit the casting of votes 
differently in respect of shares held by one and the same shareholder. 
3.   Apart from the limitations expressly permitted in paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States shall 
not restrict or allow companies to restrict the exercise of shareholder rights through proxy 
holders for any purpose other than to address potential conflicts of interest between the proxy 
holder and the shareholder, in whose interest the proxy holder is bound to act, and in doing so 
Member States shall not impose any requirements other than the following: 
(a) Member States may prescribe that the proxy holder disclose certain specified facts which 
may be relevant for the shareholders in assessing any risk that the proxy holder might 
pursue any interest other than the interest of the shareholder; 
(b) Member States may restrict or exclude the exercise of shareholder rights through proxy 
holders without specific voting instructions for each resolution in respect of which the 
proxy holder is to vote on behalf of the shareholder; 
(c) Member States may restrict or exclude the transfer of the proxy to another person, but this 
shall not prevent a proxy holder who is a legal person from exercising the powers 
conferred upon it through any member of its administrative or management body or any of 
its employees. 
A conflict of interest within the meaning of this paragraph may in particular arise where the 
proxy holder: 
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(i) is a controlling shareholder of the company, or is another entity controlled by such 
shareholder; 
(ii) is a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the company, or of 
a controlling shareholder or controlled entity referred to in point (i); 
(iii) is an employee or an auditor of the company, or of a controlling shareholder or controlled 
entity referred to in (i); 
(iv) has a family relationship with a natural person referred to in points (i) to (iii). 
4.   The proxy holder shall cast votes in accordance with the instructions issued by the 
appointing shareholder. 
Member States may require proxy holders to keep a record of the voting instructions for a 
defined minimum period and to confirm on request that the voting instructions have been 
carried out. 
5.   A person acting as a proxy holder may hold a proxy from more than one shareholder 
without limitation as to the number of shareholders so represented. Where a proxy holder 
holds proxies from several shareholders, the applicable law shall enable him to cast votes for 
a certain shareholder differently from votes cast for another shareholder. 
Article 11 
Formalities for proxy holder appointment and notification 
1.   Member States shall permit shareholders to appoint a proxy holder by electronic means. 
Moreover, Member States shall permit companies to accept the notification of the 
appointment by electronic means, and shall ensure that every company offers to its 
shareholders at least one effective method of notification by electronic means. 
2.   Member States shall ensure that proxy holders may be appointed, and that such 
appointment be notified to the company, only in writing. Beyond this basic formal 
requirement, the appointment of a proxy holder, the notification of the appointment to the 
company and the issuance of voting instructions, if any, to the proxy holder may be made 
subject only to such formal requirements as are necessary to ensure the identification of the 
shareholder and of the proxy holder, or to ensure the possibility of verifying the content of 
voting instructions, respectively, and only to the extent that they are proportionate to 
achieving those objectives. 
3.   The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis for the revocation of the 
appointment of a proxy holder. 
Article 12 
Voting by correspondence 
Member States shall permit companies to offer their shareholders the possibility to vote by 
correspondence in advance of the general meeting. Voting by correspondence may be made 
subject only to such requirements and constraints as are necessary to ensure the identification 
of shareholders and only to the extent that they are proportionate to achieving that objective. 
Article 13 
Removal of certain impediments to the effective exercise of voting rights 
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1.   This Article applies where a natural or legal person who is recognised as a shareholder by 
the applicable law acts in the course of a business on behalf of another natural or legal person 
(the client). 
2.   Where the applicable law imposes disclosure requirements as a prerequisite for the 
exercise of voting rights by a shareholder referred to in paragraph 1, such requirements shall 
not go beyond a list disclosing to the company the identity of each client and the number of 
shares voted on his behalf. 
3.   Where the applicable law imposes formal requirements on the authorisation of a 
shareholder referred to in paragraph 1 to exercise voting rights, or on voting instructions, such 
formal requirements shall not go beyond what is necessary to ensure the identification of the 
client, or the possibility of verifying the content of voting instructions, respectively, and is 
proportionate to achieving those objectives. 
4.   A shareholder referred to in paragraph 1 shall be permitted to cast votes attaching to some 
of the shares differently from votes attaching to the other shares. 
5.   Where the applicable law limits the number of persons whom a shareholder may appoint 
as proxy holders in accordance with Article 10(2), such limitation shall not prevent a 
shareholder referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article from granting a proxy to each of his 
clients or to any third party designated by a client. 
Article 14 
Voting results 
1.   The company shall establish for each resolution at least the number of shares for which 
votes have been validly cast, the proportion of the share capital represented by those votes, 
the total number of votes validly cast as well as the number of votes cast in favour of and 
against each resolution and, where applicable, the number of abstentions. 
However, Member States may provide or allow companies to provide that if no shareholder 
requests a full account of the voting, it shall be sufficient to establish the voting results only to 
the extent needed to ensure that the required majority is reached for each resolution. 
2.   Within a period of time to be determined by the applicable law, which shall not exceed 15 
days after the general meeting, the company shall publish on its Internet site the voting results 
established in accordance with paragraph 1. 
3.   This Article is without prejudice to any legal rules that Member States have adopted or 
may adopt concerning the formalities required in order for a resolution to become valid or the 
possibility of a subsequent legal challenge to the voting result. 
CHAPTER III 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 15 
Transposition 
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 3 August 2009 at the latest. They shall forthwith 
communicate to the Commission the text of those measures. 
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Notwithstanding the first paragraph, Member States which on 1 July 2006 had in force 
national measures restricting or prohibiting the appointment of a proxy holder in the case of 
Article 10(3), second subparagraph, point (ii), shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary in order to comply with Article 10(3) as concerns such 
restriction or prohibition by 3 August 2012 at the latest. 
Member States shall forthwith communicate the number of days specified under Articles 6(3) 
and 7(3), and any subsequent changes thereof, to the Commission, which shall publish this 
information in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
When Member States adopt the measures referred to in the first paragraph, they shall contain 
a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of 
their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by the 
Member States. 
Article 16 
Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Union. 
Article 17 
Addressees 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Strasbourg, 11 July 2007. 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
H.-G. PÖTTERING 
For the Council 
The President 
M. LOBO ANTUNES 
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II. CHAPTER IA OF THE PROPOSED REVISION OF SHAREHOLDERS’ 
RIGHTS DIRECTIVE. 
Article 3a 
Identification of shareholders 
1. Member States shall ensure that intermediaries offer to companies the possibility  to 
have their shareholders identified. 
2. Member States shall ensure that, on the request of the company, the intermediary 
communicates without undue delay to the company the name and contact details of 
the shareholders and, where the shareholders are legal persons, their unique identifier 
where available. Where there is more than one intermediary in a holding chain, the 
request of the company and the identity and contact details of the shareholders shall 
be transmitted between intermediaries without undue delay.  
3. Shareholders shall be duly informed by their intermediary that their name and 
contact details may be transmitted for the purpose of identification in accordance 
with this article. This information may only be used for the purpose of facilitation of 
the exercise of the rights of the shareholder. The company and the intermediary shall 
ensure that natural persons are able to rectify or erase any incomplete or inaccurate 
data and shall not conserve the information relating to the shareholder for longer than 
24 months after receiving it. 
4. Member States shall ensure that an intermediary that reports the name and contact 
details of a shareholder is not considered in breach of any restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provision. 
5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts to specify the 
requirements to transmit the information laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 including 
as regards the information to be transmitted, the format of the request and the 
transmission and the deadlines to be complied with. Those implementing acts shall 
be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 14a 
(2). 
Article 3b 
Transmission of information 
1. Member States shall ensure that if a company chooses not to directly communicate 
with its shareholders, the information related to their shares shall be transmitted to 
them or, in accordance with the instructions given by the shareholder, to a third 
party, by the intermediary without undue delay in all of the following cases: 
(a) the information is necessary to exercise a right of the shareholder flowing 
from its shares; 
(b) the information is directed to all shareholders in shares of that class. 
2. Member States shall require companies to provide and deliver the information to the 
intermediary related to the exercise of rights flowing from shares in accordance with 
paragraph 1 in a standardised and timely manner. 
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3. Member States shall oblige the intermediary to transmit to the company, in 
accordance with the instructions received from the shareholders, without undue delay 
the information received from the shareholders related to the exercise of the rights 
flowing from their shares. 
4. Where there is more than one intermediary in a holding chain, information referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall be transmitted between intermediaries without undue 
delay. 
5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts to specify the 
requirements to transmit information laid down in paragraphs 1 to 4 including as 
regards the content to be transmitted, the deadlines to be complied with and the types 
and format of information to be transmitted. Those implementing acts shall be 
adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 14a (2). 
Article 3c 
Facilitation of the exercise of shareholder rights 
1. Member States shall ensure that the intermediary facilitates the exercise of the rights 
by the shareholder, including the right to participate and vote in general meetings. 
Such facilitation shall comprise at least either of the following: 
(a) the intermediary makes the necessary arrangements for the shareholder or 
a third person nominated by the shareholder to be able to exercise 
themselves the rights; 
(b) the intermediary exercises the rights flowing from the shares upon the 
explicit authorisation and instruction of the shareholder and for his 
benefit. 
2. Member States shall ensure that companies confirm the votes cast in general 
meetings by or on behalf of shareholders. In case the intermediary casts the vote, it 
shall transmit the voting confirmation to the shareholder. Where there is more than 
one intermediary in the holding chain the confirmation shall be transmitted between 
intermediaries without undue delay. 
3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts to specify the 
requirements to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights laid down in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this Article including as regards the type and content of the facilitation, the 
form of the voting confirmation and the deadlines to be complied with. Those 
implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure 
referred to in Article 14a(2). 
Article 3d 
Transparency on costs 
1. Member States shall allow intermediaries to charge prices or fees for the service to 
be provided under this chapter. Intermediaries shall publicly disclose prices, fees and 
any other charges separately for each service referred to in this chapter.  
2. Member States shall ensure that any charges that may be levied by an intermediary 
on shareholders, companies and other intermediaries shall be non-discriminatory and 
proportional. Any differences in the charges levied between domestic and cross-
border exercise of rights shall be duly justified. 
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Article 3e 
Third country intermediaries 
A third country intermediary who has established a branch in the Union shall be subject to 
this chapter. 
 
